Socializing Realism's Balance of Power: Collective Identity as Alliance Formation in Iraq by Mardini, Ramzy
 
 
 
Socializing Realism’s Balance of Po y as Alliance Formation in Iraq  
 
wer: Collective Identit
 
A Senior Honors Thesis  
Presented in Pa   
 
 for graduation
with research distinction ndergraduate  
rtial Fulfillment of the Requirements
 in Politi l Science in the u
colleges of The Ohio State University 
ca
  
by  
 
Ramzy Mardini 
The Ohio State University  
 
August 2008 
 
 
Project Advisors:  
Alexander Wendt, Department of Political Science  
Randall Schweller, Depar ment of Political Science  t
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1
Socializing Realism’s Balance of Power: 
Collective Identity as Alliance Formation 
In Iraq1
 
 
Ramzy A. Mardini2
The Ohio State University, USA 
 
 
What is perhaps missed when observing alliances found in international politics is the 
social residue of partnerships.  This anthropocentric claim occupies a social epistemology, 
is constructed and motivated by culture, and fostered towards collective ontological 
maintenance.  Though operating as metaphysical, how would such reification modify the 
objectivism reflected in realist alignment theories, particularly the balance-of-power, 
balance-of-threats, and balance-of-interests?  In confronting this question, the Shiite-
Kurdish alignment in post-Saddam Iraq is examined, to which each realist proposition ends 
up exhibiting a degree of surfeit imbalances.  Yet rather than exclusively focusing on 
material and individualistic properties, this article attempts to promote the aspect of social 
alliances, suggesting that mutual desire towards stabilizing ontological status may conflict 
with the implications of external physicalist disparities.  In this regard, key Shiites and 
Kurds, through the process of culturizing their collective traumas and historical memories 
had both accomplished basic trust, inter-subjectively putting into practice their Kantian 
'friendship', skewing realism’s objective fix on alliances. In attempting to systematically 
incorporate an identity function in alliance formation, a dualistic balance-of-identities 
theory is offered, underlining a holistic condition corresponding to any realist thought on 
alignment patterns.     
 
 
     Are realist determinants in international relations (IR) theory only contingent on a 
materialist-inclined epistemology?  To be more direct, are alignments amongst state 
actors simply a product of the externalities of material circumstances?  Though most 
that practice the theoretical tradition would seem bent on agreeing, what is 
habitually neglected within the paradigm is the prospect of identification, as an 
instrument towards ‘socialized’ partnerships.    
     Yet to treat states as social organisms would be to inadvertently attribute to them 
the very metaphysical properties we usually associate with personhood – in effect – 
ascribing to them among other qualities: memories, emotions, and an intrinsic 
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yearning for ontological status and stability.3 Indeed, given an anthropocentrism on 
partnership ontology, a social feature is possible. If incorporating this thought, 
international alliance theory can necessitate the acknowledgment that relations can 
become personalized, attachments can spawn, and identification can exemplify 
much gravitas than realists deem. Surely, if interests are a motive towards political 
engagement, identity is an ontological de rigueur towards consciousizing those 
interests.  As Samuel P. Huntington had once candidly written: “National interest 
derives from national identity.  We have to know who we are before we can know 
what our interests are”.4  
     Nonetheless, when observing alignments amongst state actors, many realists have 
held up balance-of-power dynamics as a natural proclivity of world politics.  Indeed, 
as Kenneth N. Waltz had insisted, “As nature abhors a vacuum, so international 
politics abhors unbalanced power”.5  Though many IR theorists deviate from the 
centralism of ‘power’ in systemic configurations, all prescribe that alliances 
fundamentally inherit an epistemic objectivism, mutually determined on the centric 
values assigned to security/interests.  In attempting to provide a dialectic harmony 
with this feature, what can be theorized about the role that identity would occupy in 
balancing politics?  Offering a constructivist approach towards the identity function, 
this article claims that alliance formations amongst actors are not always, as realists 
would adamantly maintain, a saturated commonality of materialized expression.  
     Often time assigned a peripheral status, what is perhaps most overlooked by 
skeptics is the underlining ‘first-cut’ feature that identity can produce in the alliance-
making process.  To be sure, collective identity is an inter-subjective project, and 
because as such, we can perhaps think about social alliances in parallel with the 
Kantian logic of international politics. Organized and safeguarded towards 
ontological fostering, socialized alliances would suggest an interdependence relation 
that is reified, escaping the usual physicalist features placed on usual liberal 
economic properties.  Indeed, the idea of actors becoming subjectively 
interdependent would subsume the possibility of an ontological collective security.  
     But dimensionally, in the symbolic universe of international political life, how 
would such a reified aspect epistemically coincide with the ‘hard’ mannerism of 
balance-of-power politics?  Does one solidify or abate the other?  In accordance with 
addressing this question, this article suggests that when judging balancing politics, 
collective identity dynamics – in terms of inter-subjective variations of Selfness and 
Otherness – can modify the credence that realism assigns towards its material 
properties in propagating those alignments.   
     By acknowledging this claim, an extreme circumstance would then imply a 
collective identity as an alliance formation – in turn – alleging an identity-centric 
                                                 
3 Wendt (2004), p. 289.  Note: Like rationality, identities, interests, and beliefs which are 
explicitly stated as properties associated with human beings and state personhood, the 
aspects of memories, emotions, and ontological stability can also be implied here as 
belonging to persons and states.      
4 Huntington (1997), p. 28. 
5 Waltz (2000), p. 28 
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partnership.  Such salience – accessible in many ethnic atrocities found in world 
history – would place ‘us against them’ as Capulets against Montagues, with no 
input from the sovereign condition. Rational choice, in this case, would simply not 
have conscious primacy. Indeed, hypothetically speaking, if Great Britain were 
attacked by Iran, American ‘state Self-concept’ would lack any embodied process in 
choosing whom to support, as national consciousness would deindividuate in 
collectivizing an extended ‘Us’. In this respect, saturated social alliances would 
question the very ontological status of modern sovereignty, since ‘choice’ is 
metaphysically and exogenously challenged by the dilution of state consciousness 
and identity, theoretically positioning mind partly outside its body.     
     Nonetheless, though identity is a primary subject here and in much social 
constructivist literature, alliance politics has been historically a realist game. 
Likewise, scholarship on the effects of identity on alliance making is 
underdeveloped, lacking a systematic approach in corresponding with the 
established materialist domains.  In attempting to provide such a framework, this 
article focuses on understanding the convoluted politics of post-Baathist Iraq.  
Though the case study is an internal affair and elucidates its unusual alignments, that 
ought not to take away what it can illuminate about the conduct of international 
relations.  In orderly fashion, I introduce the Iraq case as a puzzle towards realist 
alliance theory. 
 
A Realist Puzzle 
 
     Since the 2003 American-led invasion, Iraq had been subject to a “power 
vacuum”, leading various players to satiate it – a common problematic feature 
encompassed by realist theory.  However, what ought to be peculiar to all alliance 
theorists is the formation of a Shiite-Kurdish alliance, where both groups – situated 
in the tribalism and identity salience of Middle East politics – differ in religion, 
ethnicity, and language.  
     From a realist standpoint, one would have to contend that Shiite Arabs and Kurds 
had joined forces to neutralize a common threat and/or foster recognized shared 
interests, provided by the division and allocation of the spoils of victory. However, 
both communities to a large extent have diverging interests on the key issues.  
Conversely, Sunni Arabs and Kurds share a common religious identity and adhere 
more on interests in relation to the rising power of the new Shiite majority.6    
     Thus, when considering that Shiites and Kurds now claim great power status, the 
puzzle practically presents itself: Why is there not a balance-of-power amongst 
Iraq’s political actors?  Reflectively, why are Kurds bandwagoning – rather than 
joining their Sunni brothers – in balancing against Shiite domination?  With the fall 
of their common Baathist enemies, the disintegration of the Iraqi military, and the 
overwhelming American presence, any astute observer would have to wonder: What 
is the threat that is forcing Shiites and Kurds to bond today?  
                                                 
6 Note: A minority of Shiite Kurds, also called Faylis, reside in Iraq, but around 90 % of the 
community is Sunni Muslim.    
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Political Realities 
 
     Violence and instability are certainly not epistemologically exogenous to the 
political culture of the Middle East.  In disproportion to an ostensibly perpetual 
liberal drift seen in contemporary Western societies, the Middle East has in many 
instances witnessed its social and political institutions ‘revert back’ to a prior inter-
subjectivity.  This to be certain: ideas may drive change to happen, but not 
exclusively in which direction. Indeed, as Walid Phares, the world-renowned scholar 
of the Middle East put it: “The last decade of the twentieth century witnessed two 
parallel intellectual debates: one within the West, over which path to follow for the 
future, and another in the East, about which past to bring into the future – secular 
nationalism or Islamic fundamentalism”.7  Such ‘torn’ societal dialogues are 
ongoing in present-day Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, Jordan, Egypt, Lebanon, and most 
notably Iraq.8
     Yet throughout the post-Saddam era, rarely is it the case that journalists and 
policymakers do justice to the shear complexity and multifaceted political culture – 
often offering ethnicities as monolithic actors in a religious, sectarian confined 
struggle – unaware of particularities, ill-conceived about universal assumptions.     
This main section seeks to reconstruct a more accurate picture of Iraq, for it is 
necessary before going on any further.  First, and most important, it is essential to 
provide the case that Iraq’s realities satisfy the criteria for which realism theory can 
validly participate. Secondly, a contemporary description of Iraqi politics is needed.  
But since the domestic situation is highly convoluted, it is impossible to do justice 
here to the overwhelming historical and political intricacies shaping today’s polity.  
Yet for the purposes of the arguments and key personalities mentioned afterwards, I 
will focus on presenting a clear and concise background of the major political 
groupings. In compliance with the topics of this section, a more appreciative 
understanding is possible when confronting the puzzle set forth in this article.   
 
An Internal Anarchy 
 
     When judging balancing politics, it is essential to adhere to the appropriate 
theoretical framework on which such conditions arise.  Indeed, as Kenneth Waltz 
had standardized, a system that is anarchic is necessary for balance of power politics 
to sort out.9  Likewise, the units populating that system must have a desire and will 
to survive.  Though the latter attitude may be considered a given in accords to the 
Iraq case, the position towards anarchy as an internal condition, rather than the usual 
international order, needs further elaboration than realist literature would 
presumably imply.  
                                                 
7 Phares (2007), p. xi  
8 Huntington (1993), p. 42.  Note: Huntington defines ‘torn countries’ as divided over which 
civilization they want to belong to, in effect claiming an identity crisis.    
9 Waltz (1979), p. 121 
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     Though to be sure, Avery Goldstein had suggested a similar methodological logic 
in prescribing an internal anarchy based on explaining a “structural alternative” on 
Chinese politics, arguing that: “by focusing on structure and identifying the 
necessary conditions for the relevance of balance-of-power theory, it is possible to 
explain…why the logic and metaphorical language informed by such a theory are so 
appropriate in understanding the political events of the cultural revolutionary 
years”.10  Accordingly, the key assumption argued in this section: Iraq is plagued 
with an internal anarchy, consistent with the realist attitude of international politics. 
Moreover, the groups involved are confined to similar unfortunate conditions, such 
as zero-sum games, security dilemmas, uncertainty, and mistrust – yet with more of 
a Hobbesian than Lockean culture.    
     In June 2006, New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman referred to the 
deteriorating security situation in Iraq as “insurgency out, anarchy in”.11  But 
anarchy is not necessarily a higher end on a peace-war continuum since it can mean 
several different things depending on which discipline is practiced.  In the realm of 
foreign affairs – that consistent with journalists and policymakers – anarchy often 
refers to a state of lawlessness and disorder.  Usually described in the context of 
‘chaos’, anarchy brings to mind the notion of rampant and ungoverned violence – 
conceived of an absence of order rather than an order in of itself.  In the context of 
IR and social science – that which is presumed here – anarchy is a theoretical social 
and structural state-of-system, arising from the absence of an arbiter – one who has 
the ability to enforce agreements among the contentious parties.  This condition, 
from the structural realist standpoint, naturally determines a self-help political 
culture. 
     As mentioned, the U.S.-led toppling of the Iraqi regime had accordingly created a 
so-called “power vacuum”.  Since then, the country has been subject to volatility, 
immense violence, looting, sectarian strife, lawlessness, terrorist and militia 
formations, human trafficking, radicalization, displacement, ethnic cleansing, mass 
elite corruption, daily political assassinations, social fragmentation, and political and 
security infiltrations by informal regional actors.  Yet many have blamed such 
cataclysm on an American presence – implying that Iraq’s order is that of a 
contingent anarchy. Indeed, while echoing Democratic Congressman John Murtha’s 
withdrawal theory, many like Mark Weisbrot asserted that “the very presence of 
U.S. troops is the number one cause of violence, terrorism, and a possible 
degeneration into a full-scale civil war”, while adding that “when American soldiers 
leave…the chances for a peaceful, negotiated solution will increase”.12
     Unfortunately, this belief exhibits a palpable misunderstanding of Iraq’s political 
and security realities.  Indeed, when confronted about the occupation being 
counterproductive to Iraqi security, Zalmay Khalilzad had addressed the common 
misperception in grouping the killings as a universal product, rather claiming the 
                                                 
10 Goldstein (1990), p. 316 
11 Thomas Friedman, “Insurgency Out, Anarchy In”, New York Times, June 2, 2006.   
12 Mark Weisbrot, “It’s time to leave Iraq”, Center for Economic and Policy Research, 2006.   
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violence as generally conceiving of multifaceted fronts – each sovereign of one 
another; each motivated by particular goals.13
 
(1) Overall Insurgency – Those fighting in direct opposition to the American 
occupation; usually crossing over from Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.    
(2) Terrorist Organizations – Groups (i.e. al-Qaeda in Iraq) consisting of radical 
Sunni Salafists and Wahabists, unbiased towards their victims, seeking to establish an 
Islamic confined territory governed by Sharia Islamic Law. 
(3) Sectarianism – Between Shiite and Sunni groups, usually involving the ethnic 
cleansing of entire neighborhoods.  The conflict was exacerbated after the February 
2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samara.   
(4) Shiite on Shiite Violence – Religious rivalries competing for power and territory 
among the Shiite community.      
 
     Consequently – in confronting Murtha and others – it is unlikely the case that 
Iraqi anarchy is characterized as a contingent order, exogenously determined by 
American policymakers.  Regime change may have lead to such an order, but its 
illogic to base that the present order can ‘revert back’ in any causational function 
provided by troop withdrawal.  To be certain, three of the four violent fronts as 
suggested by Khalilzad – which in practice constitute the most danger – will 
nonetheless still subsist and likely grow.  
     More consistent with the appropriate definition in this context, Robert Dreyfuss 
had described Iraq in October 2006 as “utterly anarchic, a Mad Max world” 
consisting of “clashing paramilitaries, gangs, warlords, sectarian fighters, death 
squads, criminal enterprises, government-backed mafias, and several hundred 
thousand army men, police, Interior Ministry commandos and special units…only 
loosely under the control of the central government”.14
     Some of course may be skeptical of Iraq’s internal structure as truly anarchic 
since a Baghdad government exists.  A fair argument, after all, is it not the case that 
central governments ought to represent the arbiter that enforces agreements among 
the domestic factions?  But unfortunately for Iraq, this is simply not concurring with 
the politics of the new state.  As Feisal Istrabadi, one of the foremost individuals 
associated with the country’s new constitutional framework, frustratingly put it, 
“there is no Iraqi government”, observing it as an illusion.15  When concerning the 
results of the American pressure for democratically held elections, he stated, “What 
did we accomplish, exactly, [with] this push towards an appearance of 
institutions…merely an appearance”.16   
     To be certain, Iraq is anarchic in the idea that power is diffused to numerous 
independent groups, competing against one another without an effective authority to 
                                                 
13 At the time of the comments, Zalmay Khalilzad was the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq (2006-
2007) and had mentioned these four violent fronts during a November 14, 2006 interview 
with the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington, DC for which I personally attended.  
14 Robert Dreyfuss, “A coup in the air”, Asia Times, October 21, 2006. 
15 Aram Roston, “Ex-top envoy calls Iraqi government a failure”, MSNBC, October 19, 2007 
16 Ibid. 
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enforce agreements among them.  Less in terms of a single state in the 
organizational Weberian conception, Iraq does not exercise uniformly, a 
monopolized legitimate use of force within its given geographic borders.  To clarify, 
Baghdad’s authority is composed as a bottom-up contingency, dependent and 
consisting of pre-established groups, primarily glued together on paper, who have by 
informally yet accepted standards, attached with them their own loyalties and 
militias controlling given territories.  Indeed, consider the following March 2008 
description of a firefight in Time Magazine: 
 
This week’s violence in Baghdad and Basra followed several days of bloodshed in the 
Shi’ite city of Kut, some 100 miles southeast of the capital, where Sadr loyalists 
clashed with police forces largely controlled by their Shi’ite rivals, the Badr Corps 
militants of the Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq, and with government troops 
affiliated with Maliki’s Da’awa party.17   
 
     Factions within an army brigade, police force, or cabinet ministry are controlled 
in a multifaceted and convoluted “unofficial” chain-of-command.  Common in Third 
World states, the Iraqi government is constructed between competing loyalties, 
undermining the idea of ‘state’ sovereignty.  But when and if accepting that premise, 
skeptics may contend that the U.S. presence satiates an arbiter. But domestic politics 
in Iraq can be viewed as interactions on two independent levels.  At a micro level – 
as just described – is a clashing of militias, parties, and the like.  However, on a 
macro level – Iraqi politics is ostensibly international.  Indeed, states like Turkey, 
Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United States exhibit internal roles.  From Baghdad to 
Arbil, Najaf to Basra, Kirkuk to Mosul – the United States is more so a political 
actor rather than arbiter, competing with others at the systemic level in pressuring 
various factions to adhere towards its interests and against the interests of their 
rivals.  
     Another argument that skeptics may make is the idea that international relations 
is expected to remain situated in an anarchic order, while in Iraq, anarchy is 
contingent on the expectation that a sustainable government will eventually come 
about.  But this claim lacks credibility on two levels.  The first is a basic flaw in 
assuming that Iraqis expect anything and behave accordingly. Indeed, uncertainty in 
Iraq is more prevalent than the sovereign-assured international system. Not much is 
really guaranteed. Though the security situation is supposedly improving, the Shiite-
Kurdish alignment came about at a time well before any optimistic expectation 
could have possibly existed.   
     The second misjudgment is the illogic behind linking expectation with 
cooperation.  Indeed, depending on the cultural context, expectations can have 
varying actions attached to them.  Because of intense suspicions and lack of any 
trust or social institutions, if Sunnis, Kurds, and Shiites all expected a solidified 
government in the near future, they would perhaps compete, not cooperate, in 
                                                 
17 Darrin Mortenson, “The Threat of a Re-Surge in Iraq”, Time Magazine, March 24, 2008. 
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gaining leverage before such an order assumed form.  To be suggestive, if Iraq were 
not anarchic, it would surely be Shiite-dominated.     
     In a prudent observation by Charles Krauthammer, Iraq’s democratic government 
came out to be “hopelessly feeble and fractured, little more than a collection of 
ministries handed over to various parties, militias, and strongman”.18  Indeed, Iraq’s 
government is not a nationally expressed institution, epistemologically conceived of 
a national identity.  The inhabitants are rooted out of historically different 
communities, only to be held together by the brutality of dictators.  
     What’s more explicatory, like other supranational polity projects practiced among 
European states, the ‘idea’ of Iraq in the metaphysical sense can be seen as a 
contingent expression – a ‘community of tribes’ if you will.  In other words, unlike 
most sovereign entities populating contemporary world politics, Iraq is most 
dominantly perceived by its inhabitants as the state of states rather than the states of 
state. Though a central government exists – like the relation between the United 
Nations and sovereign international states – it claims universal representation of 
exogenously predetermined political entities that collectively pass legislation only to 
have it lack enforcement and binding legitimate authority.  As King Faisal I said of 
his country in 1932: “In this regard and with my heart filled with sadness, I have to 
say that it is my belief that there is no Iraqi people inside Iraq.  There are only 
diverse groups with no national sentiments.  They are filled with superstitious and 
false religious traditions with no common ground between them”.19  
  
 
A Brief Look at Contemporary Politics 
 
     Kenneth Waltz had suggested that systems of three players inherited “unfortunate 
characteristics” because “two of the powers can easily gang up on the third”.20  This 
triad polity is what many journalists have both explicitly and implicitly presented 
over the course of reporting on Iraqi affairs.  Indeed, in avoiding the convoluted 
cultural and political mess found in post-Saddam society, analysts and policymakers 
in the foreign affairs business have painted Iraq as a clear-cut sectarian divide, 
viewing relations within the state at a supposed systemic level, consisting of three 
primary political communities – Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds. This outlook would 
presume that like states at the international level, these communities internally have 
their local disputes and tugging for influence, but in relation to the other “system 
actors”, inter-communal politics is essentially external.  Though this presumption 
may seem pleasing to the eye and prevalent in international media circles, the 
picture is an ostensible representation of domestic interethnic relations.  Indeed, it is 
not necessarily Sunni versus Shiite, Kurd versus Sunni in any holistic or naturally 
ordained sense.  Nor is it the case that Iraqi history had always been sectarian, 
                                                 
18 Charles Krauthammer, “Why Iraq is Crumbling”, Jewish World Review, November 17, 
2006 
19 Quoted in Allawi (2007), p. 17 
20 Waltz (1979), p. 163 
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though the suspicions are indeed present today between the generalities of ethnic 
and religious communities. 
 
The New Majority 
 
     Since the fall of Saddam Hussein, pre-existing political entities and their 
respective militias have largely dominated Iraq’s new politics.  The Shiite Arabs, 
who make up Iraq’s ethnic majority with nearly 60% of the population – were 
perhaps the biggest winners of Operation Iraqi Freedom.  To be sure, the American 
invasion had propelled a Shiite revivalism, in southern Iraq and regionally.  But 
unfortunately for them, and perhaps a relief to the other ethnic groups, the Shiites 
are not a monolith community.  Indeed, subsequent Sunni regimes have manipulated 
Shiite identity and national symbols to fragment the community.  The competing 
hierarchy of the Shiite religion had fractured loyalties between Ayatollahs and 
Islamic philosophies.  Shiite on Shiite violence is highly demonstrated in southern 
Iraq between historic religious rivalries.  Today, Iraq’s ethnic majority exhibits deep 
cuts, between Islamists and secularists, nationalists and pan-Shi’aism. Iran’s 
acceptance of millions of Iraqi Shiite refuges had over time solidified sympathetic 
identification towards Tehran, while many others maintain an anti-Persian position, 
remembering the eight-year war during the 1980s. 
     Within the 275-member Council of Representatives (CoR), various independent 
parties are embedded in larger political coalitions, with sect as the main 
distinguishing factor.  The most powerful political force is the Supreme Islamic Iraq 
Council (SIIC) – formerly recognized by its acronym SCIRI – which had won 30 
CoR seats in the December 2005 elections.  Highly organized and politically 
developed, SIIC was founded in Iran in 1982 by the influential Iraqi-exile Ayatollah 
Mohammad Bakir al-Hakim.  Today, the party is the top beneficiary of Tehran’s 
footprint in Iraq, as its military arm – the Badr Brigade – had been trained and 
funded by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC).  Fighting side-by-
side with the IRGC during the Iran-Iraq War, Badr is today’s most powerful Shiite 
militia. Being an Ayatollah of respectful religious credentials, Hakim had 
successfully integrated the powers of militancy and Shi’aism as a political force.21  
Indeed, by the time the Baathists were out, Hakim had been perceived as the key 
Shiite political figure in the new Iraq.        
     In August 2003, after Friday prayers at the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf, Bakir al-
Hakim had been killed along with nearly 100 others by a large car bomb.22  His 
younger brother, Sayyid Abdul Aziz al-Hakim had taken leadership of SIIC since.  
Pressured by the suspicions of Iranian ties, Abdul Aziz had expressed his relatively 
moderate proclivities by removing the [Islamic] “Revolution” in SCIRI, not to 
exclude making visits to Washington think tanks, and meeting with President 
George W. Bush at the White House.  In addition to being SIIC’s leader, Hakim also 
is the coalition leader of the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) – the largest political 
                                                 
21 Allawi (2007), p. 112 
22 Ibid, p. 172 
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bloc that had at one time claimed 138 parliamentary seats before the exiting of 15 
from the Fadhila (Islamic Virtue) Party and 30 belonging to the notorious cleric 
Muqtada al-Sadr.   
     The UIA had given the South a sense of community, at least temporarily amongst 
the religious Shiites.  Indeed, the coalition’s blessing by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-
Sistani had promoted a divined sense of legitimacy, complementing their Iranian 
support in dominating the Iraqi elections.  By adopting a single electoral list, the 
various Shiite parties attempted in making Shiite power reflect the majority status.  
Indeed, the UIA has since dominated the control of Iraq’s most powerful ministries, 
including Finance and Oil.  With 25 members representing the UIA, the Daawa al-
Islamiyah (Islamic Call Party) – founded in the 1960s by the Grand Ayatollah 
Mohammad Bakir al-Sadr – has benefited by SIIC’s suspicious Islamism and Iran 
ties and Muqtada al-Sadr’s radicalism, in claiming the prime minister’s office twice 
– represented by Ibrahim al-Jaafari and his successor Nouri Kamal al-Maliki. 
However, the UIA had never in its existence claimed absolute representation of the 
Shiite community, despite its dominant role in Baghdad.  For example, Muqtada al-
Sadr, though once a member of the UIA, his chief rival had always been its leader, 
Abdul Aziz al-Hakim.  Tugging for influence among religious circles, much of 
Shiite on Shiite violence is ascribed to the tension between Sadr’s notorious Jaysh 
al-Mahdi (JAM) militia and the Badr Brigade.  
     An additional blessing for Sunnis and Kurds, other influential secular Shiites had 
cut into the constituency, limiting UIA’s potential power.  Among them include 
Ahmad Chalabi, the leader of the Iraqi National Congress (INC), who had served as 
Iraq’s interim deputy prime minister.  Initially the Pentagon’s choice for prime 
minister, Chalabi had fallen out of favor with the U.S. military after suspicion 
surfaced that he was giving away American secrets to Tehran.  Deciding to 
withdraw from the UIA, the INC ended up performing poorly in the December 
elections, securing no elected representatives.  Nonetheless, Chalabi has proven to 
be a resilient political survivor, while achieving the chairmanship of the De-
Baathification Committee.  Another Shiite personality undercutting the prospects of 
UIA hegemony is Ayad Allawi, Iraq’s former interim prime minister, who heads the 
Iraqi National Accord (INA).   His list is the only respectable cross-sectarian, secular 
party in Iraq – once holding 25 seats – before the exiting of the Iraqi Communist 
Party.  Though relatively liked by many Shiites – and largely favorable to both 
Sunnis and Kurds because of his secularism and anti-Iranian stance – Allawi lacks 
the adequate political support in regaining the prime minister’s office due to the 
UIA’s dominant position.   
  
The Former Hegemonic Community 
 
     The Sunni Arabs were obviously going to be the biggest losers in a post-Saddam 
society.  Mostly confined around the center of the country, they had been effectively 
cut off from Iraq’s oil reserves – concentrated in the Shiite South and the Kurdish 
North.  Likewise, after the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) disintegrated the 
Iraq Army and applied de-Baathification throughout the governmental structure, the 
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Sunnis had officially become the most inferior of the three major ethnic 
communities.  Representing around 20% of the Iraqi population, they have 
historically maintained control over the majority Shiite Arabs.  Hence, their concern 
over an American invasion was indeed legitimate: What would become of them 
when Shiites seek their revenge? Though many Sunnis had been physical victims of 
regime oppression, they had not been subject to the sort of systematic targeting as a 
community – in contrast to the suppression of the Shiite and Kurdish identities.    
     Regretting the decision in boycotting the January 2005 elections, the Sunnis had 
since then made some relative gains.  Two major Iraqi political blocs represent the 
Sunni community: the Iraqi Accordance Front (IAF – Tawafuq) led by Adnan al-
Dulaimi and the Iraqi Front for National Dialogue led by Saleh al-Mutlaq – who 
refused to join the IAF in the December elections.  Apart from Dulaimi’s 
independent party, two others make up the IAF list – the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) led 
by Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi and the smaller Iraqi National Dialogue 
Council led by Khalaf al-Ulayyan.  Established in 1960 and evolving from the 
Muslim Brotherhood Movement, the IIP had joined Dulaimi in making the IAF the 
Sunni version of the Shiite UIA – securing 44 total seats in Iraq’s Council of 
Representatives.  Mutlaq’s bloc had achieved 11 representatives. Though still 
underrepresented in several Iraqi provinces, the Sunnis will be the most likely to 
gain seats if and when another election is held.   
 
Kurdish Exceptionalism 
 
     In orderly fashion, before beginning to address realism’s discrepancy towards the 
Iraq case, it is imperative to make one note clear regarding the peculiarity of the 
Kurdish circumstance.  In a prior section, the goal was to demonstrate that Iraq’s 
internal order corresponds to the structure of the international system with respect to 
the basic idea that both are anarchic – plagued by the absence of a central arbiter.  
Furthermore, similar to Kenneth Waltz’s reference of the relationship between firms 
and market, Iraq’s internal anarchy assumes a self-help system inhabited by factions 
motivated to survive by maximizing their power and security.  And like realism’s 
pessimistic nature, cooperation is problematic in Iraq due to security dilemmas, 
uncertainty, mistrust, and the like.  This section claims a step further than what was 
previously argued – in effect – crystallizing the notion that we can think of Iraq 
more in terms of international relations and not just as a microcosm of it.  
     Since the end of the Kurdish civil war in the late-1990s, the two dominant and 
contentious parties – the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) led by Massoud 
Barzani and the left-leaning Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Jalal 
Talabani – had come together to form a Kurdish alliance in confronting Iraq’s new 
political realities.  During the December 2005 elections, the two parties ran on the 
same political list: the Democratic Patriotic Alliance of Kurdistan, which obtained 
53 seats in the CoR – second only to the UIA.  The third largest Kurdish party, the 
Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) ran separately but was able to secure 5 
representatives.  Having the largest voter turnout among the three ethnic 
communities, Kurds were able to achieve key posts in Baghdad.  Jalal Talabani, the 
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charismatic PUK leader with immense experience and international contacts, was 
chosen to represent Iraq as its President, while Massoud Barzani was given the 
presidency of the KRG.  Likewise, Hoshyar Zebari (KDP) and Barham Saleh (PUK) 
were selected as foreign minister and deputy prime minister, respectively.  
     Representing between 15-20% of Iraq’s population and unlike the previous two 
groups, Kurds are not Arabs and likewise embrace a distinct ethnicity and language - 
geographically spanned over four states – Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey.23  Since 
2003, many Iraqi Kurds had perceived the toppling of Saddam as a big step towards 
gaining independence.  Though perhaps statehood is unlikely, Kurds have over time 
achieved a considerable degree of political and economic autonomy.   
     To international theorists, the internal affairs of Iraq often go unaware because 
their specialization (and attention) is just that – international.  But a closer look at 
the new democratic country will lead one to evidently notice its atypical 
governmental structure.  Indeed, Iraq can be visualized as two states within one – 
inhibiting a Baghdad national government in unison with an Arbil regional 
government.  In more ways than one, the interaction between Arbil and Baghdad in 
addition to the relations between Arbil and other foreign governments, constitute in 
practice – the political, economic, and diplomatic relations between two sovereign 
states. 
     After the no-fly-zones initiated in 1991 by Operation Provide Comfort (OPC), 
Iraqi Kurdistan has gone through a cultural metamorphosis of political and social 
restructuring.  The security provided by the U.S.-led initiative had effectively 
stimulated a revival in constructing and forging a distinct [Iraqi] Kurdish identity.  
With security sustained, the Kurds were able to transcend the Kurdish language into 
the “public sphere” which took root in schools, print media, and broadcasting – not 
to exclude symbolic celebrations through the Kurdish flag and the building of 
statues in honoring Kurdish heroes such as the legendary Mallah Mustafa Barzani.24  
Moreover, in 1992 the Kurds commenced democratic elections and established on 
July 4 the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) – practicing for the first time 
since 1920, their own self-governance.25  Indeed culturally transformative for all 
Iraqi Kurds, as Ofra Bengio describes: “A new political language has emerged 
which refers to these institutions in the terminology of statehood: Kurds speak of the 
“Government of Kurdistan”, the “Prime Minister”, “cabinet ministers,”, and the 
like”.26  With the fall of Saddam Hussein and the events leading towards the passing 
of Iraq’s Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) by the 25-member Governing 
Council, the Kurdish political leadership had succeeded in creating a de facto 
independent state.   
                                                 
23 Note: The Kurdish population in Iraq is uncertain because of an outdated census, genocidal 
campaign, and a large amount of displaced refugees in Turkey and Iran.  The 15-20% is 
taken from the CIA World FactBook (Iraq) and is the range commonly agreed upon by 
scholars and policymakers.  
24 Bengio, “Autonomy in Kurdistan in Historical Perspective”, in O’Leary et al (ed.) 2005, p. 
176 
25 Marr (2004), p. 277-78 
26 Ibid, p. 177 
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     The TAL, as rightly esteemed, was recognized as a historic Middle Eastern 
document in of itself – providing the blueprint for Iraq’s Transitional Government 
and its latter permanent constitution.  Many Shiites and Sunnis contest that their 
Kurdish counterparts received too good of a deal from the TAL.  Certainly 
legitimate when considering where Iraqi Kurdistan stands today – a prospect that has 
spearheaded regional concerns of pan-Kurdish nationalism in Turkey, Iran, and 
Syria.  Proving to be quite able and savvy negotiators, the Kurds made sure that the 
new Iraq would not diminish the benefits of what they already had accomplished 
since 1991, consequently promoting their resolute to secure more gains.  Today, 
Iraqi Kurdistan, in all its functional capacity is characteristic of an ordinary state.  
     For example, Kurds were able to keep their military, the so-called peshmerga, 
intact, independent from the national army.  Answerable to only the KRG, today’s 
peshmerga consist of over 100,000 highly trained and disciplined fighters.  Their 
skill was highly noticeable as they were the only standing militia allowed to jointly 
work with U.S. forces during the initial invasion.  In addition, the KRG controls its 
own intelligence agencies and police forces.  The Arbil government comprises of 
legitimate political institutions like the 105-member parliament deemed the 
“Kurdistan National Assembly”, which has the power, among other things, to write 
“Kurdistan’s criminal, civil, and commercial law; environmental protection; 
regulation of public land; running an educational system that includes three 
universities; and the definition and protection of human rights in the region.”27  
Moreover, the institutionalized executive branch consists of a Council of Ministers, 
led by the enforcement of a KRG President and Prime Minister.  
     Likewise, the TAL had provided the supremacy of Kurdish law over all aspects 
of the region with the exclusion of a few delegated to Baghdad’s authority.  These 
federal powers would be limited to monetary policy, foreign policy, defense policy, 
and customs.28  Though the federal boundaries seem overarching, in practice, they 
are not all encompassing.  For example, national defense policy is not implemented 
in the Kurdish region.  The Iraqi Army is limited from entering Kurdistan and the 
KRG reserves control of the regional police.  With regards to monetary policy, 
national fiscal policy is reserved for Baghdad but the TAL provided the Kurds the 
power to levy and collect taxes, including the rights of public spending.29  
Furthermore, in addition to a legislative and executive body, Kurds have the right to 
interpret laws subject to their region through an independent judiciary.30  Its 
territorial integrity is institutionalized and publicly noticed as Iraqi citizens can only 
travel to the Kurdish semi-autonomous region by permission of the KRG. 
     In addition, Kurdish leaders have been practicing foreign policy in corresponding 
to their semi-autonomous region.  Indeed, KRG Prime Minister Nechirvan Barzani 
has traveled to numerous countries, meeting with heads of state on behalf of the 
                                                 
27 Galbraith, “Kurdistan in a Federal Iraq”, in O’Leary et al (ed.) 2005, p. 273 
28 Ibid, p. 272 
29 Ibid, p. 272 
30 Ibid, p. 272-73 
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Kurdish region, including with President Bush at the White House.31  Barzani and 
the KRG has since 2003, signed numerous economic agreements with international 
corporations and countries without the permission from Iraq’s central government. 
But what is more interesting is the diplomatic reciprocity conveyed by others, even 
visiting Iraqi Kurdistan and its leadership as if it were a sovereign state.  For 
example, in June 2008, French foreign minister Bernard Kouchner, after finalizing 
plans to open a French Embassy Office in Arbil, had stated that Baghdad ought to 
implement Article 140 of the Iraq Constitution.32 At that time, France became the 
13th country to establish an embassy or consulate in the Kurdish capital.33  Evgeni 
Primakov, Russia’s President of the Chamber of Commerce had similarly urged the 
Article’s execution while expanding Russian-Kurdish economic relations.34 A major 
legislative and sensitive matter, Article 140 refers to the normalization process and 
potential transfer of oil-rich Kirkuk under the authority of the KRG.   
 
 
Realism’s Discrepancy 
 
     It is difficult – no matter what one believes – to dismiss realism as an 
international relations theory of the old world.  Indeed, with the fall of the Soviet 
Union, the rapid rise of social constructivism and steadfastness of neo-liberal 
theories, the realist paradigm has consistently been attacked from all theoretical 
standpoints.  As witnessed, it is often rare to be introduced to new theories without 
the direct comparison of realism.  When observing criticism from post-structuralists 
and post-modernists, from constructivists to neoliberal institutionalists, what is 
notable about realism’s survivability is its theoretical evolution from within.  Indeed, 
those belonging to a contemporary third-wave of realism – referred to as 
neoclassical – have declared to “refine, not refute Waltz”.  While undermining state 
unitary, these realists, unlike their predecessors, have considered the internal 
dynamics of states as a source for their external behavior – concurrently attempting 
to formulate a link between foreign policy and international relations.   
     Though rightly conceived as “a general approach to international politics, not a 
single theory”, all strands of realism embrace shared core beliefs about world 
politics that sustains the paradigm.35  In the words of one notable third-wave realist: 
“When anomaly does appear, or ambiguity arises as the realist perspective is applied 
to new areas of interests, or when empirical or experimental work is undertaken to 
improve the explanatory and predictive precision and power of different auxiliary 
                                                 
31 Suzanne De Rouen, “PM Barzani meets with U.S. President at White House, Kurdish 
Globe, May 29, 2008.   
32 Kawa Jam, “French Embassy opens office in Erbil”, Kurdish Globe, June 6, 2008. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Kawa Jam, “Russia and Kurdistan Region seek expansion of business relations”, Kurdish 
Globe, May 14, 2008 
35 Lynn-Jones and Miller (1995), “Preface”, in Brown et al (ed.) 1995, p. ix 
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hypotheses, change takes place in the “protective” belt, but it must not occur in the 
hard core.”36 Though scholars tend to differ in orderly emphasis, most do 
demonstrate a desire to stay true to the main roots.   
     For instance, IR scholars within this tradition underline state-centrism, anarchy, 
and self-help as characterizing the international system.  Likewise, states seek their 
goals in the context of self-interest and rationality, while emphasizing relative gains 
over absolute – usually in terms of materialized properties – such as military and 
economic power.  But as further out from these alleged core truths, divergences start 
to become observable between offensive and defensive, structural and neoclassical.  
Some contend that states seek to maximize their power; others argue security. And 
while structural theorists emphasize the distribution of capabilities among unitary 
actors in explaining behavioral patterns, those claiming to be part of the neoclassical 
trend downplay both assumptions, rather pointing to the distinction between 
revisionist and status-quo states.   
     But even with reference to these disparities, it is unfair to batter realists over their 
differences among one another, as all theoretical divisions within the IR discipline 
claim variations.  Rather, the intention of this article is to contest realist assertions 
over its universalism application of a dominant material epistemology. With that 
inquiry, looking at system alignments denotes testing them against Kenneth Waltz’s 
balance-of-power theory, a cornerstone of the realist paradigm. The following 
subsections assume just that, while establishing the overall premise that realist 
balancing theories ought to be an expressive feature among the Iraqi political units.  
While demonstrating the discrepancy in Waltz, I examine ‘refined’ balancing 
propositions articulated by Stephan Walt and Randall Schweller – proclaiming that 
both assume similar shortcomings, in large part because their theories are saturated 
with material variables when social ones really matter.      
 
Balance-of-Power: What Bipolarity? 
 
     When judging systems claimed by anarchy, structural realists argue that 
alignment patterns are inherently determined by a balance-of-power politics.  
Likewise, when assimilating the Hobbesian-like anarchy described earlier, it would 
be presumably straightforward for neo-realists to explain Iraq by their own 
definitions.  But as this section unfolds along with the noncompliance of realities, it 
becomes conspicuous that major discrepancies exist.  Emerging from the 
Renaissance and extracted from various fields of humanities and sciences as a 
“metaphorical concept”, a balance of power was acknowledged and generally 
accepted as a law of nature for its counterweight logic in establishing system-like 
equilibriums.37    
     In Theory of International Relations (1979), Kenneth Waltz seemingly defines a 
balance-of-power theory through the scope of a system-wide “distribution of 
capabilities”, largely by military and economic means.  His tripartite theory of 
                                                 
36 Schweller (1997), p. 927 
37 Schweller (2006), p. 4 
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international relations – that which consists of system order, differentiation of units, 
and distribution of capabilities – suggests that “as long as anarchy endures, states 
remain like units”, and international politics would then only differ with regards to 
the distribution of capabilities as the independent variable.38   
     Though not absolutely a complete “third-image” theory, Waltz admits that at the 
very minimum, knowing the capabilities within states is necessary.39  While 
establishing a structural approach corresponding to microeconomic theory, Waltz 
strived to science realism, discounting the properties of essentialism and “human 
nature” most often credited with classical thinkers.  Indeed, unlike the invested 
interest in “natural” values shared by his predecessors, Waltz appropriated state 
behavior in the light of extrinsic motivation, ostensibly driven by the outward 
appearance of the external environment, arguing that: “the clear perception of 
constraints provides many clues to the expected reactions of states, but by itself the 
theory cannot explain those reactions”.40  Hence, Waltz’s main goal when 
examining international politics through a supposedly scientific method was to 
establish a generalizable theory – bent on confining the possibility of outcomes 
within a specific range of predictability.  
     With this general aim, the balance-of-power theory “makes assumptions about 
the interests and motives of states, rather than explaining them.  What it does explain 
are the constraints that confine all states.”41  To be sure, balance-of-power dynamics 
is not an outcome independent of its systemic setting.  Indeed, for Waltz, two 
prerequisites were needed for balance-of-power politics to prevail: that the order of 
the system be anarchic and that it would consist of units committed to their 
survival.42  With these conditions achieved, Iraq’s alignments ought to reflect a 
balance of power among the various factions, especially considering that significant 
imbalances-of-power within this context can lead to oppression and death.     
     But when applying the theory based on the various groups’ distribution of 
capabilities, Waltz’s propositions are grossly off mark.  For instance, at the macro-
level, the two communities of Shiites and Kurds – who also attain the most 
capabilities in relation to the Sunni Arabs – have claimed a general recognition in 
support of the Baghdad government among other initiatives.  But even more 
illuminating, at every subsequent micro-relation all the way down to the individual 
politicians – those that possess the most capabilities are not only reluctant to balance 
one another, but participating in a partnership. Indeed, the two powerhouse 
coalitions – the UIA and the Kurdish Alliance – the most powerful independent 
parties – the SIIC, PUK, and KDP – and the most influential personalities – Jalal 
Talabani and Abdul Aziz al-Hakim – all claim a shared alliance.   
     The Kurdish front and SIIC were the only political factions with standing militias 
after the American invasion. To be accurate, directly after the 2003 invasion, 10,000 
                                                 
38 Waltz (1979), p. 93.  Also see Schweller (1998), p. 16 
39 Waltz (1979), p. 97-98 
40 Ibid, p. 122  
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid, p. 121 
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Badr Brigade fighters had crossed over from Iran and began an intensive recruiting 
campaign.43 Even today, the Badr Brigades and the peshmerga are considered the 
two most powerful and disciplined militias, both practicing a unified command 
structure.  Both parties encompass considerable and direct support from their 
respective communities – as the 2005 elections proved.  And as had been described 
in their respective introductory sections, both communities claim economic, 
political, and military supremacy in relation to the former hegemonic Sunnis.  
     So it is needless to say, if the balance-of-power theory were applied to Iraq, its 
premise would be explicitly contradicted in the idea that less power is actually more 
– the less you have of it, the more likely you will be balanced because of it.  A 
weaker status inherits the costs and detriments of great power status.  Consequently, 
this skewed logic inadvertently implies that the acquiring of power would 
concurrently make one less secure, not because of a supposed backlash from others, 
but rather as a function of the system.  This obviously is all inconsistent with realist 
logic in that less power is less secure because of the dangers of a self-help culture.         
 
Balance-of-Threats: Those Belgians Look Dangerous…No? 
 
     As noted, Kenneth Waltz’s balance-of-power theory exhibits serious flaws in 
judging when and why Iraq’s actors behave the way they do.  Though this criticism 
is directed towards structural realists, the shortcomings of Waltz’s theory should not 
be characteristic of the realist paradigm.  Indeed, as later insisted, though many 
theorists pass disparaging judgment on the balance-of-power for not satisfyingly 
encompassing the historic patterns of international politics, it is rightly suggested 
that Waltz is really not to blame – that in fact – he demonstrates the same errors that 
all realists independently commit.44   
     Respectively, in attempting to put forth a more accurate picture of international 
life, Stephan Walt had suggested a “modification” of the balance-of-power – 
deeming that it would make more logical sense to think of alignment patterns 
through a balance-of-threats theory.45  Instead of countering power disparities, states 
form alliances in hopes of neutralizing prevalent threats.  Accordingly, Walt seeks to 
promote a definition in what constitutes a threat: (a) Aggregate Power, (b) 
Proximity, (c) Offensive Capability, and (d) Offensive Intentions.46  These four 
variables define the degree to which balance-of-threat politics is sorted out. 
     In summarizing, he denotes aggregate power as a “state’s total resources” – 
listing examples such as – “population, industrial and military capability, 
technological prowess” and so on.47  Likewise, proximity concedes that the further 
                                                 
43 Allawi (2007), p. 139 
44 To be discussed latter, the universal realist flaw when observing alliances in this context is 
the saturation of material variables while neglecting the prospects of identity and attachment 
between states.  
45 Walt (1985). 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
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the geographic distance between two actors, the less threatening they are to one 
another. Offensive capability – in this circumstance – is largely contingent on the 
offense-defense balance.  Indeed Walt claims: “states with large offensive 
capabilities are more likely to provoke an alliance than those who are either 
militarily weak or capable only of defending”.48  Convincingly so, when offensive 
power has the advantage and “permits rapid conquest”, states that are vulnerable 
may find bandwagoning as the rational choice over balancing since the latter’s 
formation may not be quick enough to provide support.49   
     Finally, Walt introduces offensive intentions, but by its very implication, he 
perhaps steers away from the structural convention. Indeed, unlike the three 
previous, his use of intentionality implies the perception of the other’s behavior. The 
classification of offensive intentions points to actors that ‘appear aggressive’ and 
have a history of antagonism, suggesting that such characteristics are more likely to 
threaten others towards balancing against the most dangerous actor.50  
     To be sure, an alignment in this context is extrinsically instigated.  A threat forces 
inferior actors to realize: we must cooperate. Though both Waltz and Walt share the 
basic logic between balance and bandwagon to which both are treated as polar 
opposites, the latter perhaps inadvertently changes their respective meanings. As 
Walt insists, “balancing is defined as allying with others against the prevailing 
threat; bandwagoning refers to alignment with the source of danger”.51 Balancing by 
this definition is no longer about joining the weaker coalition against the stronger, 
but rather allying with the least threatening.  But when considering the Iraq case, 
how accurate is it to characterize the Shiite-Kurdish alliance as a contingency 
derived from threat?  The disintegration of their common Baathist enemies ought to 
question: What is the threat forcing Shiites and Kurds to ally now?   
     The first obvious cut would have to be the third party of the system – the Sunni 
Arabs. As commonly known, the Sunni Arabs, relative to the other two 
communities, had maintained a hegemonic position throughout the history of Iraq, 
even centuries before statehood.  But how respectable are the Sunni Arabs as an 
adversary today?  To be certain, a starting point will be testing against Walt’s four 
threat factors.  
     First, in terms of aggregate power, the Sunni Arabs only represent around 20% of 
Iraq’s total population.  After the fall of Saddam Hussein and the subsequent rise of 
Kurdish and Shiite power, their unfortunate geography at the center of the country 
had left practically encircled, and cut off from Iraq’s oil reserves.  Offensively, the 
American-led invasion and the CPA’s de-Baathification policy and disbandment of 
Iraq’s army, had left the Sunnis without any organized legitimate force.  
     Some, however, might claim that Sunni leverage is present through the 
insurgency or terrorist organizations.  But this is unlikely to constitute a sufficient 
threat to Shiites and Kurds since the U.S. military presence shares the burden in 
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51 Walt (1987), p. 17 
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confronting these groups.  Moreover, though the Sunni-orientated armed groups (i.e. 
Ansar al-Islam, al-Qaeda in Iraq, Ansar al-Sunna, etc.) are comprehensively 
threatening, they are not representative of the community or political parties.  
Indeed, these Sunni terrorists also target the Sunni community, which had in effect 
spearheaded a counter-coalition among al-Anbar Sunni tribes, now widely 
recognized as the Sahwa (Awakening) Movement.   
     Since 2006, several Awakening councils had taken form in Iraq’s other 
provinces, now claiming a 100,000-plus force with four-fifths of the coalition 
represented by Sunnis. To be accurate, many Awakening members were indeed 
former insurgents coming from groups like the 1920 Revolutionary Brigades and the 
Islamic Army of Iraq.  So from this circumstance, does the Sahwa represent a 
sufficient threat in forcing the powerful Shiite and Kurdish parties to come together?   
     Though the Awakening represents a respectable armed force – almost certainly 
defining JAM and the Badr Brigade as second-class militias – several reasons 
discount them as a reasonable intentional threat.  One reason is the obvious timing 
discrepancy: Shiites and Kurds bonded years before the tribal alliance formed.  
Secondly, the coalition is contingent on American support as the U.S. military pays 
members $300 a month in not returning to their insurgent pasts.  Thirdly, the 
Awakening, though being mostly composed of Sunnis, rather are a threat to the 
established Sunni parties, particularly those comprising the Iraqi Accordance Front, 
for a share of their political capital.  Fourth, and perhaps most interestingly, the 
Sahwa fighters desire to serve under state authority; integrated into Iraq’s national 
security forces with permanent positions and payrolls.52
     Some however might argue that Shiite and Kurds are working together to prevent 
a Sunni resurgence to power.  A common observation and accusation on Sunni 
intentionality, this idea is characteristic of the classically realist argument: the 
enemy of my enemy is my friend.  Some Sunni armed groups adopt this offensive 
goal, but as recognized and acknowledged by many, “The days of Sunni hegemony 
in Iraq are over”.53  It is by all competent means inconceivable to think of an actor 
inheriting hegemonic ambitions when they are fighting for minority rights and 
calling for new democratic elections, to which the outcome will automatically 
reiterate their subordinate status.   
     At this point, proximity is the only reality adhering to Walt’s account.  Though 
many of Iraq’s cities are ethnically mixed (i.e. Baghdad, Kirkuk, Mosul), the Sunni 
core stands in between the Kurdish North and the Shiite South.  But proximity lacks 
credibility if the other has adopted a defensive posture, not to exclude the 
reinforcement of an immense lack of capabilities and aggregate resources.  Indeed, 
the Sunnis in post-Baathist Iraq have no adequate leverage of any type to 
independently threaten Kurds or Shiites, let alone comprehensively forcing them to 
cooperate because their survival is at stake.   
                                                 
52 Ramzy Mardini, “Uncertainty Facing Iraq’s Awakening Movement Puts U.S. Strategy At 
Risk”, Terrorism Monitor, The Jamestown Foundation, February 22, 2008.   
53 Diamond (2005), p. 322. 
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     Indeed, if Walt were to suggest a balance-of-threats in Iraq, he would have to 
inadvertently acknowledge an inconsistent parallel to his theory: Why would Great 
Britain and France join together to counter a Belgium threat?  The Iraq case displays 
a similar imbalance.  Likewise, if threat was the defining feature of Iraq’s 
alignments, a balance ought to exist between Shiites and Kurds.  Though their core 
geographic settings are separated by the Sunnis, both super-communities retain 
aggregate power, offensive capabilities, and even a passable degree of offensive 
intentions.  
     The suggestion here is that Shiites and Kurds are more threatening to one another 
than their Sunni counterparts. In contrast to just the fraction represented by Sunni 
Arabs, Kurds and Shiites together claim 80% of Iraq’s total population and have 
gained access to the country’s oil supply, not to exclude controlling the most 
powerful governmental posts. With respect to capabilities, both Shiite and Kurdish 
fronts retain standing and proficient militias, overlooking given territories.  In 
addition, these organizations have institutionalized intelligence-gathering 
capabilities, provided state funding, and represented by political leadership.   
     Moreover, the Kurdish region has experienced an economic boom as 
international investors seek development projects in Iraq’s better half, as one 
Kurdish newspaper headlined: “Visiting Kurdistan Region is Like Leaving Iraq”.54  
One recent example of this success was in June 2008, when the KRG prime minister 
had signed a $4.5 billion agreement with the United Arab Emirates in building a 
hotel and resort complex in Arbil.55 However, the success of the Kurdish regional 
project has threatened Shiite preference. Indeed, as Baghdad and the South were 
locked in security, economic, and political miseries, the KRG was debating and later 
implementing a smoking ban, hoping to combat the unhealthy effects of second-
hand smoke.56  The intellectual center of Sulaimaniya was flourishing, film festivals 
were commencing, as Kurdish English-based newspapers displayed affairs from 
around the world, including new company advertisements stating: “Coming Soon To 
An Oil Field Near You”.57 To a lesser extent, the UIA receives respectable funding 
and support from Tehran, while millions of Muslims each year travel to places like 
Najaf and Karbala – two of the most religious cities in Shiite Islam – making 
donations to the clerical leadership.58  Arab Sunni states on the other hand are 
tentatively involved in Iraq.59  They do not express much supportive enthusiasm, 
because the new state will forever now be Shiite-orientated. 
     To reiterate, Kurds are overwhelmingly Sunni Muslims, so it would be a 
proclivity to assume that Sunnis will band together when Shiite power rises.  Both 
Sunni Arabs and Kurds share the common threat of Iran and its political and security 
infiltration through Iraq’s governmental structure. The Iranian takeover of Iraqi 
                                                 
54 “Visiting Kurdistan Region is Like Leaving Iraq”, Kurdish Globe, May 14, 2008. 
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56 Khidhr Domle, “War on smoking continues in Kurdistan”, Kurdish Globe, May 29, 2008. 
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intelligence via Shirwan al-Wa'eli, Iraq's Minister of State for National Security 
Affairs and UIA politician, comes to great concern for non-UIA parties.60 Moreover, 
both Sunni Arabs and Kurds are threatened by the ambiguous ambitions of religious 
Shiite parties, including SIIC and Daawa.  Indeed, during the negotiations leading to 
the TAL, religious Shiites had fought to impose Sharia Islamic law as the primary 
source of legality.  Moreover, for the Kurds, it was clear that Grand Ayatollah Ali 
al-Sistani “only reluctantly” supported the concept of federalism – which is a key 
issue in maintaining Kurdish autonomy.61           
 
Balance-of-Interests: Bandwagoning For Loss 
 
     In more ways than one, Stephan Walt’s theory offers a more satisfying approach 
than the classical balance of power.  Rightly so, though his theory is less 
parsimonious, it is nonetheless a more encompassing approach that fills in many 
gaps.  But as depicted and similar to its antecedent, the balance-of-threats displays 
gross inconsistencies when tested against the alliance dynamics inside Iraq. As 
suggested in the prior section, Kurds and Sunni Arabs had not allied to confront the 
rise of Shiites, even when both share a common religion and likewise the rising 
salience of another religion ought to force them to bond together.  Of course, the 
Kurds did the opposite and instead allied with the Shiites.  But if not out of 
“strategic surrender” (bandwagoning) and not out of a respectable threat (balancing), 
what then could have established the alliance.  
     Respectively so, Randall Schweller offers a balance-of-interests theory wherein 
he attempts to fill in what Walt and Waltz had overlooked: the “opportunistic 
aspect” of bandwagoning.62  Indeed, like Waltz’s definitions, Walt is no different 
when treating balancing and bandwagoning as behaviors in direct opposition to one 
another.  Moreover, both theorists share the perception that the former behavior – 
not the latter – is the prevalent alliance pattern found in international history.  
Though confessing that perhaps bandwagoning is more frequent, unlike his 
predecessors, Schweller contends that inquiry should not be focused on whether 
bandwagoning or balancing is more common, but rather on examining the 
conditions under which behavioral pattern arises.63  For Schweller, it is the state’s 
orientation, not an imbalance of power or threats that can differentiate and tell us 
who is going to balance and who is going to bandwagon.     
     Consequently, similar to Hans Morgenthau’s “imperialist” state, the balance-of-
interests theory points to the distinction between status quo and revisionist states.  
To be sure, Schweller correctly points out that Waltz and Walt exhibit a ‘status-quo 
bias’ to which both emphasize that all states adhere to securing what they already 
have as non-negotiable, above all other interests and endeavors – contending that 
security must first be achieved before any other politics.  Because of this notion, 
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Waltz and Walt put forth of a very narrow definition of bandwagon: succumbing to 
either power or danger, while overlooking the prospect that states looking to gain 
something might “bandwagon for profit”.64   
     In applying a balance-of-interests towards Iraq, we can assume that Kurds are 
bandwagoning with the Shiites in order to reap the rewards of the relationship.  This 
is a respectable argument and more realistic than what status-quo balancing theories 
would suggest.  But again, like the previous realist theories, reality provides another 
story.  Though both Shiites and Kurds share interests at varying degrees on various 
issues, they disagree on the key issues that ought to be definitive of their polarity. 
Rather than defecting, the Kurdish alliance had compromised to cooperate, offering 
the theory that they had no other options.  But such constraints on alternatives need 
not exist, for the Kurds and Sunni Arabs have more common interests than either of 
them in relation with their Shiite counterpart.  As Larry Diamond had observed, in 
recognizing the end of their hegemonic days, Sunnis now:  
 
…want to keep the Shiites from turning the tables on them.  They want a guarantee of 
a minimum share of power and resources.  Ironically, they have, in this respect, a 
common interest with the Kurds, who also wish to see the state structured in a way 
that will guarantee each regional group its share of national wealth and autonomy 
over its own affairs, while preventing any one group from dominating at the center.65   
 
     Indeed, Sunnis and Kurds had collectively opposed Ibrahim al-Jaafari staying in 
power as prime minister, eventually forcing the UIA to drop him.66  In addition, as 
Henri Barkey and Ellen Laipson had claimed, Sunni “interests may well align with 
the Kurds in the strategic sense of their shared status as minorities”.67  To a 
surprising extent, Mahmoud al-Mashahadani, the Sunni speaker of the CoR, had 
even supported the KRG’s right to sign oil contracts with international 
corporations.68 Operating from its own passage of an oil law, the KRG has signed 20 
oil and gas exploration and production-sharing contracts with 15 international 
companies, one being Korea National Oil – a South Korean state-owned company.69  
These independent economic relations bypass the Baghdad government, causing a 
great deal of tension between Kurds and Iraq’s Shiite government – who’s Oil 
Minister Hussein Shahrastani, a UIA politician, has referred to the economic 
projects as illegal.70  
     Perhaps the key interest that Kurds and Shiites diverge on is the explosive issue 
of Article 140 of the Iraq Constitution.  Involving the reversal of the Baathist 
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“Arabization” campaigns, Article 140 is meant to determine whether Kirkuk – a city 
ethnically populated by Kurds, Arabs, Turkomen, and Chaldean Christians – would 
be annexed under the authority of Baghdad or Arbil. According to Peter Galbraith, 
“the Shi’a religious parties…are hostile to a Kurdistan region with substantial 
powers and are unlikely to be compromising on the issue of Kirkuk – especially 
because many of the Arabs who moved to Kirkuk are Shi’a”.71 The Article’s 
successful implementation, involving the designation of Kirkuk – which holds 6% of 
the world’s known oil reserves – is above all other interests and the key defining 
issue for the KRG.  The Shiite government under Prime Minister Maliki had 
purposely delayed the procedural provisions of the legislation, allowing it to pass the 
December 2007 deadline stipulated in the constitution.  Though the Kurds had 
agreed to delay the issue, many Shiite lawmakers are proclaiming that Article 140 is 
no longer constitutionally valid. 
     By most accounts, and in communal terms, we may claim that Shiites in the new 
Iraq represent the status quo community.  Like states of this type in the international 
system, though they seek interests that favor their standing relative to others, the 
Shiites’ general and absolute goal is to maintain their newly found majority and hold 
onto what positions they have gained throughout the governmental and civil 
institutions.  In contrast, Sunni Arabs are considered revisionists in this context.  
They – the hegemonic power of the old days – have been marginalized to an extent 
where their power as a minority status is proportionally substandard.  Indeed, their 
reluctance to participate and foster the new democracy – along with the 
organizational and funding capacities given to Kurdish and Shiite parties – have left 
them grossly underrepresented throughout Iraq’s local and national governments, 
from Ninawa to Diyala province, onward to Baghdad.  Sunnis have been calling for 
new elections ever since – regretting their strategic blunder – in an effort to reassert 
a “respectable” and standard minority status.  Key Shiites however, have tended to 
delay such actions recognizing that it would chip away what status they already have 
– reiterating their status-quo position.   
     With respect to the Kurds, their underlining belief was that participation in the 
new Iraq must at the very minimum not come at the cost of their already peculiar 
position, thanks to the 1991 implementation of a no-fly-zone.  Since 2003, the PUK 
and KDP have made great strides and gains, as witnessed through the Transitional 
Administrative Law and the provisions set forth in the Iraq Constitution.  Hence in 
strictly legal terms, Kurds may appear satisfied.  But the political realities would 
more accurately situate them in the revisionist camp – because if the contemporary 
were taken as a status quo, Kurds would undeniably be infuriated with that 
circumstance. 
     For the Kurds, the issues of Kirkuk, among other “disputed territories”, their 
sovereign economic relations with international corporations and states, their 
resistance towards integrating the peshmerga into the national armed services or 
downgrading its armed force, among other issues is all at stake – pressured by the 
Shiites in maintaining their status quo footing.  Until those provisions are safely 
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secured, Kurds are unsatisfied with the way things are. Indeed, the only ethnic 
community truly satisfied with the contemporary circumstance as a continuous 
reality is the United Iraqi Alliance.  Indeed, as Dr. Mohammed Ihsan, a KRG cabinet 
minister, put it: “The Shia are afraid of their past...they have nothing to be scared of 
in the future because they are a majority”.72  Conversely, the “Sunnis are afraid of 
the future, but they had a great past ruling the country.  We Kurds are the ones who 
are afraid of both their past and the future”.73  In addition, one may presume that 
Kurds are revisionists in that their ultimate goal – satisfied by the economic 
foundation provided by oil-rich Kirkuk – is to become an independent state by a 
complete break away from Baghdad.  Though this is a debatable argument in its 
absoluteness, it is hitherto no secret that the Kurdish government is striving for more 
autonomy at the reluctance of a Shiite central government.  
     Nonetheless, the key point made here: a balance-of-interests theory would 
presume the formation of a Shiite-Kurdish alliance based on markedly contradicting 
interests.  For instance, Schweller claims: “Satisfied powers will join the status-quo 
coalition, even when it is the stronger side; dissatisfied powers, motivated by profit 
more than security, will bandwagon with an ascending revisionist state”.  But from 
this perspective, a balance-of-interests is fundamentally not compatible with the 
Shiite-Kurdish relationship, nor is it consistent with the Sunnis – since it would 
suggest that dissatisfied powers would bandwagon with the ascending revisionist 
Kurds.   
     The orientation of the Shiite-Kurdish partnership would presumably mean that 
within the same system (Iraq), a dissatisfied actor jumps on board with the status-
quo power when such bandwagoning ventures – rather than balancing ones – would 
lead to greater loss, not less, and lesser profit, not more.  If taking this line of 
reasoning further, one would allege that Kurds are bandwagoning not for their 
benefit, but against Kurdish interests themselves.  Yet it would be difficult for 
realists, or anybody for that matter, to conceive of balancing against yourself.  
Nonetheless, it is in fact puzzling, that one partner aims at sustaining the current 
system, the other at changing it, yet an alliance is formed when these very political 
and potent ends are obvious and in contention with one another, especially in zero-
sum terms.  
  
 
The Socializing of Alliance Politics 
 
     Contemporary realism contends that alliances are forged in order to maintain a 
balance of some sort (i.e. power, threat, interest).  Though different strands of the 
paradigm may diverge in what causes state actors to balance or bandwagon, the 
debate’s propositions are largely invested in material and individualistic properties.  
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     In attempting to make sense of what looks like an abnormal, “going against the 
grain” partnership, what is introduced as its possible derivation is a socialization 
effect, provided by the internalization of their collective sufferings under previous 
Iraqi regimes.  In this perspective, I argue that Kurds and Shiites came together to 
foster their ontological status, which had been collectively disrupted and destabilized 
by the horrific terror experienced under Saddam Hussein. Consequently, the 
prospect of this article is not necessarily to diminish realist assertions in 
international alliance theory, but instead to promote an underlining social dimension 
often left ‘undiscovered’ when observing alignments in world politics.    
     Common to IR theorists, realism often affiliates its outlook on politics with a 
supposed Hobbesian-like pessimism – in effect – proscribing theoretical claims 
towards a self-help international system.  Yet as Alexander Wendt had pointed out, 
the very idea of balancing means that the actors involved have a “mutual recognition 
of sovereignty”.74  Indeed, Waltz’s “emphasis on balancing, his observation that 
modern states have a low death rate, and his assumption that states are security – 
rather than power-seeking are all things associated with the relatively self-restrained 
Lockean culture”.75  Though to be sure, Iraq’s internal anarchy is more consistent 
with Hobbes than the rivalry-orientated international order.  Hence, one would 
wonder why cooperation in Iraq is even possible to begin with.  For instance, take 
into consideration that relation between Shiites and Sunnis and Sunnis and Kurds 
exhibit proclivities guided by general mistrust, unconstructive historical memories, 
and a lack of contemporary positive inter-ethnic communication.  In contrast, this 
section is meant to argue that the collective victimization experienced by Shiites and 
Kurds under Baathist and prior Sunni regimes had transcended a mutual 
understanding of the other’s suffering, consequently leading to a more Lockean than 
Hobbesian relation between the two – which in effect had marginalized and skewed 
realism’s material premise on alliance politics.           
     To make clear, the fall of realist theories in this context is its academically rigid 
and uncompromising policy towards assigning universally, material variables that 
are consistent within one socio-cultural dimension, to another.  It is not that realists 
believe social and identity factors are unimportant or the idea that they do not 
matter; rather that they treat them with constant inferiority in which social 
considerations never trump material ones.  Some realists however, may just claim 
that the Iraq case is an anomaly; that realist theory was never meant to explain 
particularities.  To be certain, what is happening in Iraq is indeed peculiar.  But a 
case’s uniqueness ought not to permit its insignificance.   
     The question that theorists should infer: Why isn’t realist theory complying when 
it clearly should?  The basic puzzle is that realism ought to be representative of Iraq, 
yet as demonstrated in the previous sections, it is not.  The fact that the case study is 
a statistical paucity overlooks the underlining premise of the problem – that realist 
theory is mainly based off a material epistemology, conceptually top-down, 
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prescribing universal assumptions while treating socio-cultural dimensions as 
unchanging and flat.  
     So far, I have argued that Iraq is plagued by an internal anarchy similar to what 
realists contend about the international order. Likewise, though Waltz’s proposition 
is not expressive within the Iraq context, neither are refined theories – suggesting 
that the paradigm is missing not just peripheral elements that correspond to 
anomalies, but rather a ‘basic core’ that need be treated prior.  Indeed, when judging 
the Iraq case, each inherits an imbalance of power, threats, and interests – suggesting 
that in order to establish an external stability amongst all three, a balance, rather 
than an alliance, is needed between the two super-communities.  In essence, the 
puzzle for realism is reflectively two-fold: Why is there a sustained imbalance and 
why is there not an attempt at system-equilibrium?  In other words, why are Shiite 
Arabs and Kurds cooperating in the first place when material considerations say they 
should not, and why are Sunni Arabs and Kurds not banding together when realist 
theories suggests they should?   
     With respect to these questions, I bring forth a social variable, adamantly 
overlooked by realist theories, in an attempt to make light of the unique Shiite-
Kurdish relationship.  When doing so, “trauma theory” is presented as the theoretical 
context – not by psychoanalytic methodologies – but in the social and cultural claim 
of collective abuse.  Though this type of inquiry and research is largely 
underdeveloped, its causational aspects related towards identity formation are 
gaining more attention within the sociological theme of collective identity studies.76  
Likewise, it is imperative to note that trauma – as the term is used here – is ‘a 
theory’ of socializing alliances since it is not the only macro-process that could 
potentially lead to a collective, cross-categorization among groups.  Hence, trauma 
theory is not the subject under investigation, nor are the claims made here intended 
for the purposes of its theoretical expansion as an independent field of scholarship.  
Rather the key assertion is that under certain conditions, social bonds may contradict 
material ones to a degree that abates realism’s balancing propositions – the 
analytical aspect in which trauma is being used here. 
 
Collective Trauma: An Introduction 
 
     Plagued by the common curse of Middle East politics, Iraq’s present and future is 
conflicted by its past memories.  While taking this thought with serious inquiry, 
looking into trauma can shed light into the awkward alliances that have shaped the 
political makeup of the new democratic state.  This section lays out the idea that 
collective trauma, as it relates to collective violence, can help establish a theoretical 
framework in supporting the intentions and goals of this article when confronting 
realism’s material monopoly of alliance politics.  Likewise, portrayed as process, 
trauma is elaborated here as a social construction, giving emphasis on agency 
towards transcending an unfortunate event to a collective identity.  
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     International history is absorbed and often defined by bloody wars, epidemics, 
conflicts, political assassinations, oppressions, revolutions, declining empires, 
colonial rule, and genocide.  During such trials and tribulations, trauma is felt and 
processed among peoples, internalizing the suffering, despair, and pain associated 
with the tragic experience – claiming the story as a part of their story.  Conversely, 
in opposition – triumph – pertaining to ideas of glory, victory, independence, and so-
called “golden eras” can also construct and generate collective identities.  This is to 
be expected; as the saying goes, the victors get to write the history books.   
     But while undervalued and perhaps “undiscovered” when observing international 
life, trauma plays a significant role in the way societies and states attach meaning to 
their hardships and tragedies.  In turn, those that had dealt with losses and cultural 
pain socially construct – in a similar epistemic logic to triumph – tribal, ethnic, 
societal, national, and regional identities.  
     However, in light of academic scholarship, what is trauma?  We often in 
everyday conversations throw the term around and refer to one being traumatized as 
a mental state, overwhelmed by fear and shock that paralyzes our senses to react in 
an ordinary and rational manner.  Culturally described with words like ‘shocking’, 
‘violent’, and ‘terror’, Hollywood films and cultural dispensers alike will portray 
traumatized individuals in a state of unresponsive fixedness, mentally cut off from 
their social environment.  Often verbalizing such experiences as being in a “state of 
shock”, we at the very least recognize that such afflictions bear a psychological 
punishment on the human psyche.  But trauma is much more conceptually dynamic 
and likewise its consequences can be much deeper, going beyond the obvious 
physical and psychological; towards interrupting a group’s ontological security – 
destabilizing their sense of Self.  Need treated within an interdisciplinary context, 
collective trauma – as the idea used here – can intertwine social, political, cultural, 
psychological, and economic dimensions.77   
     Piotr Sztompka characterizes trauma as “sudden, comprehensive, fundamental, 
and unexpected”.78  Similarly, Cathy Caruth described it as “an overwhelming 
experience of sudden or catastrophic events” for which “in its unexpectedness and 
horror, cannot be placed within the schemes of prior knowledge”.79  Arthur G. Neal 
admits that trauma occurs when an “ongoing activity has been interrupted by an 
adverse happening that is unexpected, painful, extraordinary, and shocking…an 
explosive quality about it because of the radical change that occurs within a short 
period of time”.80  Arguing against psychoanalytic perspectives, Jeffrey Alexander 
maintains that trauma takes place “when members of a collectivity”, whether as 
individuals or groups, “feel they have been subjected to a horrendous event that 
leaves indelible marks upon their consciousness, will mark their memories forever, 
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and will change their future in fundamental and irrevocable ways”.81 Though these 
portrayals are generalized, collective trauma is distinctive because it can bear 
sociological and cultural processes that become significant to the victim’s (and 
perpetrator’s) identity.82  
     As publicly acknowledged when referring to the Kurdish and Shiite conditions 
under Saddam Hussein, traumatic events are often present in the context of horrific 
violence and torture.  Though violence obviously entails injuries to the body, the 
collective trauma witnessed in Iraq cannot be condensed into a single level of 
analysis since it does not just target the body, but also the psyche and socio-cultural 
order.  In addition, the consequences of such processes are not limited to just non-
Western, Third World societies, as “collective traumas have no geographical or 
cultural limitations” and apply to all societies “without prejudice”.83  As Neal had 
illustrated, Americans themselves have had their share of collective memories 
affected by national traumas such as the Great Depression, the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor, the assassination of John F. Kennedy, among many others.84
     Various psychological and sociological factors can lead to collective identity 
formation among a group, community, or even states.  Collective trauma can be one 
such epistemic mechanism. Though different typologies exist within the 
contemporary literature, unlike those at the micro-level, or as some refer to as 
psychological trauma, collective trauma – as it relates to a macro political and 
cultural community – have significant consequences pertaining to collective identity 
and collective security.  Distinct from individual process – collective trauma inherits 
“consequences for values, beliefs, and attitudes held by the mass public toward 
issues that it associates with the traumatic event”.85  In distinguishing the micro and 
macro conceptualizations of trauma, Kai Erikson offered: 
 
By individual trauma I mean a blow to the psyche that breaks through one’s defenses 
so suddenly and with such brutal force that one cannot react to it effectively…By 
collective trauma, on other hand, I mean a blow to the basic tissues of social life that 
damages the bonds attaching people together and impairs the prevailing sense of 
communality…a gradual realization that the community no longer exists as an 
effective source of support and that an important part of the self has 
disappeared…“We” no longer exist as a connected pair or as linked cells in a larger 
communal body.86
 
     Rather than affecting the behavior or perceptual views of a few individuals, 
cultural and political trauma can impinge on large communities of peoples, even 
civilizations.  Similar to the physical injuries of a body, trauma is damage to culture 
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– its order, symbolic meanings, and inter-subjective epistemology – representing a 
tear in the social fabric that is needed to make individuals a people, part of a larger 
collectivity.  In essence, it is a dent in one’s collective identity, impeding on one’s 
ontological sense of security.  But instead of healing through natural biological 
means, repairing a cultural wound is contingent on several factors; one being the 
successful transformation of one’s suffering to another’s sympathy and empathy.   
 
Trauma Extension: Expanding the Circle of “We” 
 
     As provided, trauma episodes can dynamically affect those that are inflicted.  
However, it can also become interrelated to which collective trauma can “create 
communities”, where “otherwise unconnected persons who share a traumatic 
experience seek one another out and develop a form of fellowship on the strength of 
that common tie”.87 Convincingly, when others do share one’s suffering and 
experiences, it might be suggested that “societies expand the circle of we”.88 But 
collective violence, as exhibited among Iraq’s diverse groups, does not 
automatically lead to a collective identity.  One is simply not a causation of the 
other, as “events are not in themselves inherently traumatic”.89  It is certainly 
obvious when observing the history of wars and atrocities that there indeed exist 
numerous examples of tribes, nations, and states not adhering to the auspicious 
prospects of collective identity formation.   
     Needless to say, the Soviet Union and the United States became mortal enemies 
right after collectively suffering from the trials of Nazism and fascism during World 
War II.  Before then, Europe’s dark past had states less concerned with identity as 
they formed alignments amongst each other in preventing the domination by a 
common aggressor.  A notable example of this common misfortune was the Rape of 
Nanking.90  In late 1938, from orders of the Imperial government, Japanese forces 
invaded and massacred 300,000 residents of Nanking China in six bloody weeks. 
Unlike the Holocaust, the Rape of Nanking was widely known and acknowledged, 
as critical Western observers reported the atrocities to the world.  Yet, the trauma 
had little contribution to the collective identity of the Chinese people – and unlike 
postwar Germany – fell flat to the way democratic Japan perceived itself.           
     So it goes without question, that it is empirically safe to say – and perhaps 
literally – that the sharing of past enemies does not independently constitute the 
hopes for a future partnership.  But this is not to say that sharing enemies cannot 
possibly lead to sharing identities; that alliances cannot transcend from being based 
on extrinsic needs to being built on common narratives.  That propitious possibility 
lies in the aspects of successful trauma extension in the context of empathetic 
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diffusion and morality.  By this very feature, trauma is represented here as a social 
construction.  Hence, the degree to which communities are created through common 
suffering is contingent on agency.  As Jeffrey Alexander puts it, “for an audience to 
be traumatized by an experience that they do not directly share, symbolic extension 
and psychological identification are required”.91
     As noted, though having extensive affects on group identity, not all individuals 
within that group directly experience the violence that is affiliated with the effects of 
trauma, for as Bernhard Giesen had suggested, “social constructions of collective 
identity are never unanimous”.92  In reference to trauma experienced under violence, 
the method of extension can be suggested as the “reaching out” phase in what 
Alexander calls the trauma process.93  To be sure, the extent of influence, in terms 
of identity formation in the context of cultural and political communities, the 
extension phase is not only a critical component for those processes, but also a 
determinant in linking the sufferings of the victim to a larger collectivity.  This 
transmission can take numerous forms through cultural carriers, such as in 
materialistic and symbolic representations, psychological identification, myths, 
emotions, sympathetic expressions, empathy and condolences, cultural rituals, 
literature, movies, songs, education, memorials, and many others.  It is through this 
extension, that we begin to sympathize and identify the suffering of the Other and 
internalize their experiences as a part of our moral Self.   
     Perhaps the most academically researched case in this context is the Jewish 
Holocaust.  During the late 1940s and into the 1950s, most Americans did not 
identify with the tragedy that had generated the Jewish trauma.94  As Alvin H. 
Rosenfeld once wrote about that time in America, “A prevalent attitude was to put 
all of “that” behind one and get on with life”.95  With regards to American society, 
they had been the ones that defeated and ended their suffering, freeing them from the 
evil of Hitler, and helping establish the Israeli state.  In describing a similar 
narrative, Deborah E. Lipstadt argued that from the end of the Second World War to 
the 1960s, many were too busy in the “can-do” optimistic stride prevailing in 
superpower America.  He writes: “Those who had returned from the war were 
concerned with building a family and a career, not with dwelling on the horrors of 
the past…It did not seem to be an appropriate time to focus on a painful past, 
particularly a past which seemed to be of no direct concern to his country”.96  
     Indeed, the United States had just defeated the armies of Nazi Germany and 
Imperial Japan, claiming its status as the new global superpower, a position that had 
yet to be experienced among Americans.  Europe by the most optimistic accounts 
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was in political and economic disarray; meanwhile a very salient rivalry was 
brewing from communist Soviet Union.  Even more so, Americans were dealing 
with their own losses in the war, adjusting their lives and in many instances, starting 
over.  Only later, through the diffusion of Jewish trauma, did American society 
begin to empathize and identify with the horrific stories of the Holocaust.  As 
dramatists Francis Goodrich and Albert Hackett put it when justifying their use of 
language for a play of Anne Frank’s Diary: 
 
What we all of us hoped, and prayed for, and what we are devoutly thankful to have 
achieved, is an identification of the audience with the people in hiding.  They are 
seen, not as some stranger people, but persons like themselves, thrown into this 
horrible situation.  With them they suffer the deprivations, the terrors, the moments of 
tenderness, of exaltation and courage beyond belief.97   
 
     Here the dramatists were focused on using symbolic extension and psychological 
identification in personalizing the Jewish suffering in World War II.  Anne Frank’s 
written account and personalization of her tragic experience of the Holocaust was –
due to technological advances – identification and extension on an enormous scale, 
leading Americans and many others to sympathize and identify with the Jewish 
experience.   Undoubtedly, as the sincere and touching story was translated and 
circulated around the world, “the journal recorded by a young Dutch girl in hiding 
from the Nazis, and evolved, via a phase of Americanization, into a universal 
symbol of suffering and transcendence”.98  Rosenfeld writes: 
 
….widely read in American schools, and American youngsters regularly see the stage 
and film versions as well.  Their teachers encourage them to identify with Anne Frank 
and to write stories, essays, and poems about her.  Some even see her as a kind of 
saint and pray to her.  During their early adolescent years, many American girls view 
her story as her story, her fate as somehow bound up with their fate.99  
 
     Indeed, numerous examples of extension in Europe and the U.S. had been 
performed in what Jenny Edkins referred to as the commercialisation of the 
Holocaust trauma, arguing that the tragedy was “packaged and sold as a 
commodity”.100  In the United States, on top of the Holocaust Memorial Museum 
located in its capital city, appearing in the 1990s were films like Schindler’s List and 
Life is Beautiful.101 In Great Britain, Nazi Germany was such a big part of the 
educational syllabus that “historians complained that it was the only period of 
history children were familiar with”.102  
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     Depicted as a “cultural transformation”, the Holocaust – an atrocity inflicted to a 
specific group of people – has in the course of over half a century been redefined as 
the tragedy of all mankind.103  Once fixated as an event with particular traumatic 
remembrance, the once ‘a Jewish torment’ had been extended through the social 
construction of collective trauma, as a shared universal remembrance – internalizing 
a sense of universal morality.  In the consciousness of many, this once dormant pain 
now “vividly lives in the memories of contemporaries whose parents and 
grandparents never felt themselves even remotely related to it”.104
     Hence, like many others, the Rape of Nanking mentioned earlier had failed to 
epistemologically move beyond China, even beyond Nanking, because of the failure 
to implement trauma process – the diffusion and dissemination of their trauma to 
others.  Similar shortcomings can be found in the “distant suffering” of Rwanda, 
Cambodia, and Guatemala.105  These unfortunate occurrences happen for reasons 
pertaining to both culture and social structure, in which the “carrier groups” did not 
have the interpretive capacity, resources, or authority, to circulate the victim’s 
burden – leaving the lessons of such atrocities neither ritualized nor 
memorialized.106  Furthermore, as a consequence of this, “new definitions of moral 
responsibility have not been generated.  Social solidarities have not been extended.  
More primordial and more particularistic collective identities have not been 
changed”.107 Trauma and its potential political effects is simply contingent on 
successful extension; without passing the suffering to others, victims miss out on 
what Martha Nussbaum referred to as “the social benefits of pity”.108      
 
 
A Historically Shared ‘Victim Narrative’ 
 
I often reflected, when I was in solitary, that Kurds share the suffering of the Jewish 
people.  We feel the same pain.  What Hitler did to the Jews, Saddam did to the 
Kurds.  Personally, I have great compassion for the Jewish people.109
                
                                                                                   - Fawsi Muhammad Bawrmarni  
                                                                                     Kurdish political prisoner 
                                                                           
     The memories of victimization and inferiority have had a defining role in the 
Shiite and Kurdish narrative – ironically it being the only historical commonality 
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between them.  Indeed, though both communities differ in religion, language, and 
ethnicity, they had shared together the historic miseries the Baathists gave them.  To 
be accurate, even prior to that distinguished era, Shiites and Kurds were 
systematically marginalized in political, social, and cultural participation by Sunni 
elites and monarchs.  Throughout state history, ethnic Sunnis had dominated the Iraq 
Army at the officer level, and while Shiites were represented in parliament, the 
institution’s composition had reflected a divide and conquer pattern, characteristic of 
colonial rule.  Moreover, national educational policy and school textbooks had put 
little investment in Kurdish and Shiite culture – often times neglecting their heritage.    
     But life in Iraq was not always like this, as one would commonly assume.  
Indeed, the July 1958 Revolution – promoted by the ambitions affiliated with the 
era’s ideals of Pan-Arabism – had lead to mobs dragging the bodies of King Faisal II 
and the crown prince through the streets of Baghdad.  Afterwards, under the 
direction of Iraq’s new leader, General ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim, the first systematic 
attempt had been commenced at using cultural and historical memories in 
“officially” forging a common national identity.110  Shiites and Kurds had perceived 
the coup leader favorably, in some respects because his mother was a Shiite, and 
Mullah Mustafa Barzani was invited to return from exile.  But more importantly, 
through the functional centralization of state institutions, like the Ministry of 
Guidance and Directorate-General of Folklore, Qasim had begun to orderly 
document Iraq’s culture.  From community to community, the state was active in 
“organizing the screening of films in rural areas, and in establishing regional 
libraries and museums” in an effort to promote lacking social institutions.111  In 
addition, the new leadership had in historic proportions, significantly put Shiites, 
Kurds, women, and other minorities to government positions.112   
     But these nationalist tendencies had contradicted the ambitions that had 
perpetuated the revolution. Originally backing the leader’s promotion to power, pan-
Arabists began withdrawing and shifting their support.  Strategically, Qasim had 
begun backing away from his pro-Kurdish tendencies and after 1959, shut down 
Kurdish organizations, arrested Kurdish communists and nationalists, and “Arabized 
the names of Kurdish localities”.113  By 1961, Qasim had militarily engaged Barzani 
over Kurdish ambitions, leaving the regime vulnerable with few supporters.    
Consequently, the once promising era was to be short-lived.   
     After a coup in 1963, ‘Abd al-Salam ‘Arif took power, and life for Shiites and 
Kurds hastily drifted back towards old sectarian habits.  Reconciliatory policies that 
had been achieved were reversed.  After ‘Arif’s accidental death in 1965, his brother 
‘Abd al-Rahman took over.  Though both brothers had initially sought to woo 
Kurds, state action took a different direction.  Weak and ineffective though, the ‘Arif 
rule had ended with another coup in 1968, ascending Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and a 
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young Saddam Hussein to power – an era that Shiites and Kurds would experience 
their worst and most defining historical memories.     
     Throughout the 1970s and onward, the state began the “Arabization” campaign of 
Northern Iraq.  Its most notable project was Kirkuk, which forcefully entitled the 
removal of ethnic Kurds, replacing their vacant homes with Arab families.  As the 
‘Diaspora’ of Kurdish history, Kirkuk is commiserated as the “Jerusalem of 
Kurdistan” for perhaps as many as 600,000 were forced to leave with many never to 
be seen again.114  Moreover, the state implemented gerrymandering policies, 
detaching sections of the territory to assure that Kurds remained a minority.  Even 
the Kirkuk province’s name was changed to the Arabized “Al-Ta’meen”.115  
     By the time Saddam Hussein pushed aside al-Bakr, an Islamic revolution in Iran, 
inspired by the charismatic Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, had instigated a 
devastating eight-year war.  Known to be the most conventional since 1945, the war 
had claimed the lives of nearly 400,000 Iraqis, many of them Shiites, who made up 
most of the army.  For the Kurds, what had happened towards the end of the Iran-
Iraq War had “reverberated” since in their consciousness; that till this day they insist 
on never forgetting the massacre at Halabjah – a city just southeast of Sulaimaniya 
province.  After PUK and Iranian forces captured the small town, the Iraqi 
government retaliated through the use of chemical weapons on March 16, 1988.  
Over 5,000 Kurds died that day and many thousands more injured, leaving a 
crushing effect on Kurdish morale. Though this was an isolated event, a large-scale 
atrocity was being waged during that time.  Prior to Halabjah – the notorious Anfal 
campaign began and lasted until the destruction of the town of Qala Deza in 1989.116  
Gassing was the method of choice, as witnessed on August 29, 1988 in the town of 
Bazi George where nearly 3,000 Kurds were chemically gassed to death.117   
     Representing a modern genocide, characteristically systematic and intentional in 
its operation, Anfal was nothing short of absolute state terror, committed towards 
wiping out the Iraqi Kurdish population.   To be sure, the campaign had affected 
“the entire civilian population of Kurdistan…in one way or another” for it had 
displaced one and a half million Kurds and depopulated half of the Kurdistan 
landmass.118  Saddam’s cousin, Ali Hassan al-Majid – earning his notorious 
nickname “Chemical Ali” – was heard on a tape recovered by the Kurds after the 
first Gulf War: “As soon as we complete the deportations, we will start attacking 
them everywhere according to systematic military plan.  I will not attack them with 
chemicals for just one day, but I will continue to attack them with chemicals for 
fifteen days”.119 When all was said and done, 4,000 villages were destroyed and 
nearly 200,000 Kurds were killed – about 5% of Iraq’s Kurdish population.  
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Afterwards, many newborns exhibited tragic deformities – a constant reminder of 
Saddam’s terror.  But what was perhaps for all, the core of the Kurdish identity 
meant one had suffered, as one Kurd had described his personal trauma this way: 
 
I had seen many sorrows….And I knew grief.  Like all Kurds of my generation, I’d 
known grief in a personal way, all my life.  I still grieve for my son, as I did when he 
died.  The pain cut deep into my wife’s soul.  My wife cried all the time, after the 
death of our son.  She was always so sad, always crying.  When a women cries, cry 
with her.  I tried to comfort her….and all of our Kurdish friends and comrades in the 
camp tried to help her but the pain she felt was so deep, so deep.  Many nights, she 
couldn’t sleep, and she’d cry out the name of our son and cry and cry.  Sometimes, I’d 
wake and she’d be gone.  I’d follow her tracks in the snow….And I’d find her by the 
grave of our son….laying her arms on his grave and weeping….Now we have a 
daughter….Our great hope is that our daughter never sees the pain and suffering we 
have seen.120   
 
     Following the liberation of Kuwait – the 1991 intifada (uprising) had ignited on 
the ill advice of President George H.W. Bush, who publicly encouraged the 
oppressed to take matters into their own hands.  Additionally, the scene of Iraqi 
soldiers retreating from Kuwait’s borders humiliated and demoralized also stirred 
thoughts of rebellion.  Starting on March 1 in Basra, rebels under the direction of 
Islamists and defected Iraqi soldiers had begun to violently form mobs, killing any 
Baathist in reach.  In coordination with Iran’s IRGC, Bakir al-Hakim’s Badr 
Brigades infiltrated the city, and persisted an insurgent campaign.  News began to 
spread throughout southern Iraq: Basra had fallen under Shiite control.  Within days, 
the rebellion spread to new streets and by March 5, all major cities in southern Iraq 
had fallen under rebel control – Basra, Karbala, Najaf, Kut, Amara, Nasiriya, 
Samawwa, and Diwaniya.121  In the North, Suleimaniya was the first city to fall on 
March 8 and soon afterwards, Kirkuk would come under Kurdish control.  The 
intifada looked like a success; both Kurds and Shiites had tasted a felling of 
liberation; a felling of collective triumph – relative to a silent and notably inactive 
Sunni center.122      
     The events proved overwhelming to Baghdad, as the nearest rebel was only fifty 
miles away from the city.  Saddam Hussein – deeply worried that his rule, like many 
of his predecessors, could be violently coming to an end, would retaliate swiftly. 
Under government orders, Republican Guard soldiers entering Basra from Kuwait 
began shooting unconditionally – killing women and children.  Tanks that were 
directed to the South had attached on them the state’s battle slogan: “There will be 
no Shi’a after today”.123  The brutality was unprecedented, as one Iraqi General 
described a massacre in the Shiite city of Hilla:  
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We captured many people and separated them into three groups.  The first group we 
were sure was made up of people who were guilty.  The second group we had doubts 
about, and the third group was innocent.  We telephoned the high command to ask 
what we should do with them.  They said we should kill them all, and that’s what we 
did.124   
 
     No respect was assured, for religious shrines were severely damaged, including 
Najaf’s Imam Ali and Karbala’s Imam Husayn.  Saddam showed no mercy, as he 
televised a disfigured Grand Ayatollah al-Khoei as a part of his propaganda 
campaign, mocking the religious hierarchy while intimidating Shiite rebels.125  Iraqi 
fighter helicopters allowed for prompt mobilization, as surface-to-surface missiles 
were first used to weaken rebel positions before tanks rolled in to finished the job. 
Within weeks, the Shiite rebellion was neutralized, as Saddam’s attention shifted to 
the North.  Only recently experiencing a genocidal campaign, the Kurds did not wait 
around for another.  Millions evacuated and flocked toward the Iranian and Turkish 
borders, as human rights organizations and journalists displayed cities of refugee 
tents to the international community.    
     In essence, the horrendous and demoralizing effects experienced by Shiites and 
Kurds are largely placed under the same social context – hence the recognition in 
sharing a common ‘victim narrative’. Like the ontological damage done when a 
mother neglects its child, state abandonment and mistreatment had left both 
communities with deep cultural scars, forever changing their respective group 
identities and Self-concepts. When political expediency counted, Iraqi leaders had 
made reconciliatory promises, only to latter implement opposite polices, inflicting 
further communal injury.  Throughout Iraqi history, both Shiites and Kurds were 
neglected and marginalized together by the same perpetrator.  Both were 
systematically “constituted the primary base of opposition” towards the Sunni elites, 
the State, and Saddam Hussein.126  Moreover, as Hanna Freij points out, both groups 
were subjected to “coercion and symbol manipulation” in undermining their identity 
and culture.127     
     For instance, the Shiites had been banned from participating in cultural rituals, 
such as the religious Ashura – the Karbala martyrdom of the Prophet’s grandson, 
Husayn ibn Ali.  As Ali Allawi had observed, state programs of nationalizing, 
“emigration and expulsions destroyed the Shi’a mercantilist class; the state 
monopoly on education, publishing and the media removed the cultural 
underpinnings of Shi’a life”, not to exclude that the threat to Najaf religious order 
had nearly eliminated Iraq’s hawzas.128  For the Kurds, the state had neglected them 
as a distinct identity, only officially recognizing them as “people of the mountains”.  
During one census survey, they were forced to register as Arabs under a program 
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called “Changing National Identity”.129  The Kurdish language was forbidden as 
state educational policy was directed towards Arabizing historical memories.  In 
collectively recognizing their receiving end of terror and systematic manipulation, 
Kurds and Shiites had distinguished themselves as encompassing a more Selfness 
narrative in contrast to the Otherness of the Iraq state.  Indeed, when distinguishing 
this Self/Other dynamic, the Kurdish political prisoner, Khamel Yaseem Mohammad 
Dosky stated:       
 
The silent Ba’athists…who turned a blind eye…the Ba’athists without blood on their 
hands, they call themselves, as if the jailer at Auschwitz was no different than the SS 
guard…. Oh, the Iraqi guards were without shame.  Saddam was without shame.  It 
was said that before the Iraqi Army would massacre Kurdish villagers and Shia 
villagers, first, the Iraqi Army medical teams would take their blood.  Then, the Iraqis 
would kill them.130
    
     The collapse of the 1991 uprising had massacred perhaps over 30,000 in 
weeks.131  Six months after, as executions were commenced, an estimated 300,000 
Shiites were killed.132  Like many of their fellow Kurds, their bodies were to never 
be seen again.  When the uncovering of mass graves began for the first time in 2003, 
Shiites and Kurds shared the trauma of mourning, confirming the loss of those said 
to have “disappeared”.  Some mass graves had both Kurds and Shiites buried 
together.  Likewise, when Saddam and prominent Baathists had been captured or 
killed, Shiites and Kurds celebrated and danced in the streets, often times in contrast 
to quiet Sunni neighborhoods.  And when the United States had turned a blind eye to 
the 1991 uprisings, both communities branded it the “Betrayal of 1991”, as they had 
collectively anticipated an apology from the CPA.  The point is that in the final 
analysis, the common traumas and triumphs experienced had ripened the rapport 
opportunity for Shiite and Kurdish political actors to grow in friendship; an 
opportunity that historic reality deemed not possible in extending to Sunni Arabs.       
 
 
Righting the Past: Cooperation Under Anarchy 
 
….the work of healing also involves the issue of ‘basic trust’ – this time 
reconstructing trust in the social institutions and cultural practices that structure 
experience and give meaning to human lives.  Large-scale violence and massive 
trauma disintegrate trust in the social structures that make human life possible.  
Institutional acknowledgment – in the form of ‘truth’ commissions and reparations 
(monetary and symbolic) – and justice – in the form of trials of perpetrators – can 
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begin partially to restore the symbolic order that is another casualty of the work of 
violence.133   
                                 -  Marcelo M. Suarez-Orozco and Antonius C. G. M. Robben 
 
     In 2008, Rauf Naqishbendi had observed, “the lack of any historic or customary 
mutual sympathy between the Kurds and Shiites, has rendered them incapable of 
uniting in any effective way, to combat Sunnis”.134  Though ‘a lack’ does not imply 
a complete absence, his belief is exceedingly misplaced, as reality has not only 
reflected Sunni deficiency, but also a degree of disproportional cooperation inside 
Iraq. In this section, I will demonstrate that empathy does exist amongst Kurds and 
Shiites in terms of generalized and significant Others, where the actors involved 
convey sympathy towards the other macro community and express at the micro 
level, personal friendships.  To be sure, the focus here will be on Iraq’s most 
significant relationship: that of the Kurdish Alliance and the Supreme Islamic Iraq 
Council, most notably the Talabani-Hakim comradeship. 
     Like most Kurds, the Iraqi President Jalal Talabani had experienced trauma in a 
personal way and likewise so had the Hakim family – they being Saddam’s first 
systematic aim on subjugating the Shiite religious community.  To be accurate, 
Saddam had killed 10 brothers of Abdul Aziz al-Hakim’s, not to exclude several of 
his other close relatives.135  Having shared a common victim narrative, tendered 
commiseration, and routinized relationships while putting into practiced their 
collective opposition to the Other, both Talabani and Hakim – the heads of the two 
most powerful coalitions – had become socialized towards friendship.  As Talabani 
had confessed: 
 
…..we have old historical relations with Brother Al-Sayyid Abd-al-Aziz al-Hakim.  
Mr Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim is the son of the imam, Grand ayatollah al-Sayyid Mushin 
al-Hakim, may God have mercy on his soul, who was loved by the Kurds because he 
issued a fatwa against fighting the Kurds, whereas the sycophants of the regime 
supported the government against the Kurds.  This made the Al-Hakim family loved 
and respected in Kurdistan.136
 
     Indeed, as Iraqi Kurds have always remembered, the defining moment that had 
first established a historic sense of trust between the two political groups was the 
actions of Grand Ayatollah Mushin al-Hakim – the father of Abdul Aziz and 
Mohammed Bakir.  Throughout the 1960s, until his death in 1970, Mushin was the 
Marji’ al-Taqlid, the highest Shiite religious authority. During this time, the state 
had influenced and coerced religious personalities in “instrumentalizing Islam” 
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against the Kurds. The Sunni ‘ulama (religious authorities) had issued fatwas – 
religious orders – towards the “martyrdom of the soldier who died in Northern Iraq, 
and the godlessness of their adversaries, the Kurdish nationalist militants”.137  
Though some Shiite clerics had done the same, Mushin had “constantly” rejected to 
issue any such fatwa against Kurds.138  Instead, he had put into practice the complete 
opposite, issuing a fatwa against the war waged on the Kurdish people.  As Quil 
Lawrence had pointed out, this “courageous move” by the Grand Ayatollah had 
“formed a bond between Iraq’s two victimized peoples, though they were usually 
separated geographically by the Sunni-dominated region in the center of Iraq and the 
Sunni-controlled government in Baghdad”.139  Indeed, directly after the religious 
decree, many Shiites that populated the Iraq Army began “suddenly wasting 
ammunition” by shooting over the heads of their original Kurdish targets.140  A 
significant and genuine leap to socially extend, the Mushin’s munificent action had 
always been remembered by Kurds, as Jalal Talabani had acknowledged to Al-
Arabiya Television: 
      
I do not know if you have seen how Abd-al-Aziz al-Hakim was received by the 
masses, not by Jalal Talabani.  At the mass rally that was held for him in Al-
Sulaymaniyah, people gave him a standing ovation and applauded for five minutes.  
In Halabjah he was given a hero’s welcome and this is due to both the old and new 
relations.  We do not deny that we have social ties with Abd-al-Aziz al-Hakim.  
These relations have special flavour.  Therefore, nobody should blame us if the 
reception for Abd-al-Aziz al-Hakim was warmer than the reception accorded to any 
other Iraqi politician.141   
 
     In accordance, the collective violence that inflicted both communities, had 
promoted the opportunity for them to together form an opposition movement.  
Indeed, during Saddam Hussein’s tenure, Shiite and Kurdish groups had joined 
forces in toppling the regime.  Ahmad Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress had 
initially served as the umbrella organization to which included SIIC, PUK, KDP, the 
Islamic Movement of Kurdistan, and Ayad Allawi’s Iraqi National Accord.142  
Chalabi and the Iraqi Communist Party, which consisted of mostly Shiites, had 
stationed their operation headquarters in Iraqi Kurdistan, as meetings between Kurds 
and Shiites took place in Europe and Iran.   To be sure, Chalabi had once gone far 
enough to support Kurdish self-determination in seceding from Iraq.143  Though all 
had exhibited varying degrees of cooperation, SIIC and the Kurdish factions had 
initiated a formal alliance, apart from the others.  Indeed, the late Ayatollah 
Mohammed Bakir al-Hakim had independently signed a “mutual agreement” with 
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first the PUK and later on the KDP, as the party’s official website reaffirmed that his 
father’s generous fatwa had promoted over the years a “historical and warm” 
relationship with the Kurdish people of Iraq.144   
     Over the decades in working together against the Baathist regime, Jalal Talabani 
had established personal relationships with key Shiite figures.  One being the 
friendship of over 30 years with “brother Adil” – a reference to Adil ‘Abd al-Mahdi, 
SIIC’s most savvy politician – who Talabani admits is “close” to the Kurdish 
community.145  Being one of Iraq’s two Vice Presidents, the “pro-Kurdish” Mahdi 
had provided the Kurds a “more accommodating SCIRI position” on the Kirkuk 
issue in contrast to most United Iraqi Alliance participants, especially the defiant 
Sadrists and Daawa Party.146  Another powerful Shiite personality is Iraq’s National 
Security Advisor, Mowaffeq al-Rubaie, who had during the CPA transitional period, 
conducted himself as the liaison between the Iraq Governing Council and Grand 
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.  During a 2007 interview with The New Yorker, Rubaie 
described his longtime friendship with Talabani in a personal manner:   
 
He’s very difficult to define.  If you are an Islamist, he brings you Koranic verses; if 
you’re a Marxist, he’ll talk to you about Marxist-Leninist theory, dialectics, and 
Descartes…..He has a lot of anecdotes and knows a lot of jokes.  He is an 
extraordinarily generous person, and he spends like there is no tomorrow.147    
 
     “There are no permanent enemies for him”, Rubaie professes while emphasizing 
the Kurdish leader’s pragmatism, “But there are permanent friends”.148  Indeed, to 
be suggestive, a more ‘permanent’ feature in the Kurdish-SIIC alliance is arguable 
when one provides moral support, exemplifying social interdependence.  One 
example of this occurrence was during an event marking the second anniversary of 
the Badr Brigade’s political transformation to the Badr Organization.  As a guest 
speaker, Talabani had addressed the harsh critics of the militia: “May those who 
describe the heroes of Badr and their Kurdish brothers as militia be doomed to 
failure”, latter adding “You and your [Kurdish] brothers are the heroes of liberating 
Iraq.  You, my brothers, march on without paying attention to the enemies’ claims 
because you and the [Kurdish militia] are faithful sons of this country”.149  But aside 
from these personal and party-to-party attachments, Iraqi personalities had 
interestingly expressed sympathy towards the generalized ‘victim community’, and 
likewise, indifference with the former hegemonic Sunnis.  In a 2006 interview, 
Talabani had passionately alleged: 
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Dozens of our Shi’i Arab brothers are killed every day and the Sunni Arabs do not 
denounce these criminal acts.  Instead of doing so they demand for instance better 
treatment for 20 detainees placed in a small prison room.  How can you compare this 
with that?  Can we compare the killing of dozens of peaceful Shi’is in their 
seminaries and in their markets with the arrest of dozens of Sunni Arabs and putting 
them in unhealthy prison conditions?150
 
     When speaking on behalf of his coalition, he avows: “we in the Kurdistan front 
stood by our Shi’i Arab brothers when they were exposed to oppression”, 
demanding that many were “unjustly killed”.151  By the same token, his Shiite 
counterpart, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim had at numerous times publicly identified with 
the general Iraqi Kurd.  Indeed, when questioned in 2005 about how far the next 
Baghdad government would be willing to adhere to the aspirations of Kurdish 
autonomy, Hakim answered:  
 
The ambitions of the Kurds are well documented.  Kurds are our brothers who fought 
for several decades and suffered greatly under the harsh rule of Saddam.  It is only 
fair that they should demand the removal of some of the unjust laws that were then 
imposed upon them.152
 
     But to clarify, the Shiite community is not a monolithic social entity.  Though 
many Shiites empathize with Kurds, many to an extent do not.  These sorts, although 
possessing the common wounded story, had not collectively participated in the 
expression of that story as had SIIC and others.  Indeed, some form of ‘contact’ is 
essential for inter-subjective growth.  But it is interesting nonetheless, that the 
threatening salience of a more identified ‘Otherness’ can activate once lacking 
sentiments.  As suggested by the firebrand Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, who 
adamantly professes no sense of rapport towards the Kurdish people, only to had 
furiously vowed to defend them when Turkey initiated a military incursion.153    
  
Symbolic Extension 
 
     Saddam Hussein had once said during his court trial, “My message to the Iraqi 
people is that they should not suffer from the guilt that they killed Kurds”.154  To be 
accurate, Shiites had populated most of the Iraqi Army, though Sunni officers, 
whom many came from Tikrit, directed them.  Yet signs of trauma extension were 
witnessed throughout the post-Saddam era, from the construction of Iraq’s 
constitutional framework to memorialization and contemporary balancing politics. 
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     During the hotly contested negotiations in constructing the TAL, attempts by 
Arabs were directed at marginalizing Kurdish autonomy and other provisions, such 
as Article 61(c), dealing with the ratification of a future permanent constitution. Yet 
after back and forth negotiations, the Shiites on the Governing Council had ended up 
supporting the TAL “as it stands”, with the desired rights allocated to the Kurds.155 
To be sure, aspects of emotion and sympathy were present, as Larry Diamond had 
claimed, the Kurds “repeated appeals to the atrocities they had suffered and the 
sacrifices they had made…paid off handsomely in the final document”.156 Though 
some Arabs believed “the Kurds have the right to their ethnicity” and be treated “as 
brothers”, others contested “dictatorship of the minorities”.157  
     Nonetheless, those that did share empathetic feelings towards Kurds had 
expressed them during the TAL negotiations, like Mowaffeq al-Rubaie had when 
pushing for federalism:  
 
There are certain things we have learned from the massacres, from the Arabization 
campaign, and so on.  One is the need to acknowledge our cultural, confessional, and 
regional diversity…Centralization is the source of our divisions.  It has isolated 
Kurdistan.  Southern Iraq never felt affiliated to Iraq…Believe me, whatever fears the 
Iraqi people are experiencing are important.  If I were a Kurd, I would fear central 
power might stage a massacre again...We can’t just forget these fears...158
 
     One incident during heated negotiations where many participants had put down a 
Kurdish speaker, Ghassan al-Atiyyah, who had left Iraq during Saddam’s rule, had 
defended: “We should listen to what the Kurds want and we should help them.  I am 
an Arab...We have persecuted the minorities for fifty years in this country.  Arabs 
need to correct their mistakes”.159   
     With respect to their savvy negotiating skills, it is nonetheless self-evident that 
the Kurds would not have gone as far if it had not been for their traumatic history. 
The TAL had secured among other provisions, Kurdish autonomy, Kurdish 
language, the KRG, peshmerga, and federalism as a key feature of Iraq’s 
governmental structure.  The passing of the TAL was self-esteemed as a historic 
opportunity, emphasizing minority rights and while evoking the suffering of his 
people, Barzani had declared, “This is the first time we Kurds feel that we are 
citizens of Iraq”.160   
     After the election of the Iraqi government, symbolic exchanges had continued 
after the adoption of a permanent constitution. Since then, monetary commissions 
were given to those that had been deported and displaced. Pre-Arabization residents 
of Kirkuk were moved back into the city, while payments were given to Arabs to 
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help them move to their original neighborhoods.  In 2008 for example, some Shiites 
and Kurds worked together to change Baathist features of the Iraqi flag, as it was a 
symbol of trauma for many.161 Likewise, five Iraqi judges of Kurdish and Shiite 
origin overlooked the tribunal that had been put together in hearing the Anfal case –
which included Saddam, his cousin “Chemical Ali”, and five other co-defendants 
involved in the genocidal campaign.162  
     One exceptional symbolic outreach had been the memorialization of the Halabjah 
incident, which the city’s mayor had declared “the identity of the Kurdish 
people”.163 During the 20th anniversary of the Halabjah incident, Shiites among 
others had attended the ceremony in which Prime Minister Maliki was to “raise the 
curtain of a monument of martyr Omar Khawar”, the epitome of the atrocity, which 
is represented as a Kurdish man embracing his child killed by the chemical attack.164  
Observed with 5 minutes of silence in mourning, the Iraq government had decided to 
offer the United Nations a draft resolution in considering March 16 a global day 
against chemical weapons.165
     But even when considering symbolic politics, alliances have formed amongst key 
Shiite and Kurdish parties, with the exclusion of Sunnis.166 Yet frequent in 
contemporary Iraqi politics, when alliances and counter-alignments emerge and 
former allies become rivals, it is interesting that SIIC had always been reluctant to 
balance against their Kurdish friends, and vice versa.167  Indeed, even when Maliki 
had aligned with opportunistic Sunni and Shiite parties against the PUK – KDP – IIP   
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alliance, Abdul Aziz al-Hakim had criticized the government Maliki heads and had 
even flirted with joining the Kurds.168       
 
 
Socializing Realism 
 
     Several ideas and critiques have been presented thus far.  One is a methodology 
similar to Avery Goldstein’s – the claim that we can treat Iraq’s internal order as 
consistent with the realist premise of international politics.  From this basic 
assumption, realist theories ought to play out – especially in a culture defined by a 
more Hobbesian-like anarchy than the sovereignty-assured international system.  
Secondly, gross misrepresentations exist when analyzing the Iraq case with the 
“balance-of” theories articulated by Kenneth Waltz, Stephan Walt, and Randall 
Schweller.  But with the injection of collective trauma as a derivation of the Shiite-
Kurdish alignment, we ought to think of a possible formation of partnerships based 
on other than material sources – this bringing us towards a more social realism.     
     To be sure, Waltz’s reference of bipolarity is naturally ordained by structure, 
surfacing as a causational aspect when two powerful actors dominate a given 
system.  However, what is imperative and adamantly overlooked, is the “idea” that 
bipolarity has embedded a characteristic social feature, defining the relationship 
between the two – conceivably distinguishing Self and Other in international 
political life.  Indeed, two actors can dominate all others, but the degree of polarity 
in bipolarity is contingent on how far apart they inter-subjectively place one another 
within the socio-cultural structure, not the material one.  Hence, it would be a 
conceptual flaw to view Iraq as expressing an internal bipolar structure even though 
two supposed superpowers – the United Iraqi Alliance and the Kurdish Alliance – 
dominate the system.  Indeed, as Alexander Wendt famously declared in a 1992 
article, “anarchy is what states make of it”, and likewise so is polarity and an 
imbalance of power.169   
     Convincingly so, this reference is not limited to just Waltz.  For instance, Walt’s 
construction of the balance-of-threats from the four variables he provides also does 
not give consideration to the socio-cultural order.  If his theory were applied 
unconditionally, France and Great Britain would satisfy 3 of the 4 sources of threats, 
but commonly known to all, their inter-politics is exceptionally disproportional to 
their ostensible threatening inertias.  He, like Waltz, mistakenly embeds his theory 
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within just one epistemic framework, while discounting the other – which can too 
affect what a threat looks like and likewise what it does not.   
     Perhaps implicit, one of the main arguments the Iraq case is meant to provide is 
that realism, in essence, is a conception based off an epistemic flat world, reluctant 
to view actors as multifaceted and changing agents in of themselves.  As Jennifer 
Mitzen observes, “No realist argument fully captures the identity effects of 
persistent conflict, because none acknowledges the social construction of state 
identity”.170 Hence, from this problematic lens, realists end up ostensibly perceiving 
alliances as only occupying one conceptual dimension – an individualistic and 
material one. Indeed, Christopher Layne provides a similar illogic, arguing that “the 
reason states balance is to correct a skewed distribution of relative power in the 
international system”.171  By this very individualistic observation, one would 
mistakenly only consider motivations that adopt to satisfy extrinsic needs, not 
ontological.  
     Indeed, for Waltz, a balance of power “explains why a certain similarity of 
behavior is expected from similarly situated states.”172  Taking this into 
consideration, how would realists explain a condition when very differently situated 
states end up behaving similarly – like the Kurdish and Shiite communities in Iraq?  
Both are cooperating when their situated status suggests that one ought not to.  
Likewise, similarly situated – Sunnis and Kurds – express dichotomous behaviors.  
To problematically reiterate, why is there a sustained imbalance of power-threats-
interests, and little or no effort at neutralizing it?  The answer: both parties are 
choosing to ally, not out of structural reasons (Waltz) or extrinsic necessities (Walt) 
or material gain (Schweller), but more so in adherence to an intrinsic motive based 
on strengthening their social bond and culturalizing their collective traumas – 
making sure their history and sacrifice means something – in essence, securitizing 
their ontological status.    
     Charles Krauthammer, for instance, had once written that in the aftermath of 
Iraq’s regime change, “What was left in its wake was a social desert, a dearth of the 
trust and good will” needed to establish genuine democratic governance. To be sure, 
Iraq’s problematic underlining is not necessarily an asymmetrical distribution of 
power and resources, but a historic deficiency of social institutions. While lacking 
any sense of basic collectivity, the memories of its inhabitants are mostly localized, 
as group inter-relations were dominated by centuries of mistrust, instilled by regimes 
and Sunni elitists in order to divide and conquer the populous.   
     Indeed, since ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim, no state project was genuinely offered in 
constructing a national narrative.  More accurately was the case that Sunni regimes 
since the 1963 coup were bent on social fragmentation as a societal strategy to abate 
regime vulnerability. Though Saddam himself had used symbolic methods to unite 
Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War, state brutality – i.e. the 1980 execution of Grand 
Ayatollah Bakir al-Sadr, the Anfal campaign, and collapse of the 1991 uprisings – 
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had overshadowed any memory and hope of national sentiments achieved.  Hence, 
after the American invasion and the international media emphasis given to the so-
called “power vacuum”, what was adamantly overlooked as Iraq’s essential 
characteristic defining its Hobbesian status was that of a social vacuum.  As 
Krauthammer points out, “All that was left for the individual Iraqi to attach himself 
to was the mosque or clan or militia” for “Iraqi national consciousness is as yet too 
weak and the culture of compromise too underdeveloped” for any collective state- 
allegiance to be produced.173    
     Of course, as demonstrated, Iraq had not exhibited a complete absence of social 
development.  Traumatic damage, like threats, whether physical or ontological, can 
have a socialization effect.  Indeed, furtively underneath the ethnic cleansing and the 
historic culture of enmity, a relationship between Kurds and Shiite factions 
nonetheless had been constructed, routinized, and socially extended.  Building a 
narrative upon their collective traumas, both had institutionalized Self from Other as 
the ‘non-Sunni’, ‘anti-State’, ‘anti-Saddam’ victims.  Through this process, key 
players from both communities became interdependent on one another, not by 
political or economic means, but social and cultural needs.  In effect, they achieved 
together an ontological narrative – providing that their collective sufferings have 
meaning and a historic presence in their memories – a narration of the Self; an idea, 
an emotion, a belief of what it means to be an “Iraqi Kurd” and an “Iraqi Shiite”.  
Hence, after the removal of Saddam, this distinct relationship had progressed 
forward, cooperating right away as routinized friends, leaving behind an Iraq stuck 
with its past suspicions and hostilities.      
 
Towards A Balance-of-Identities Theory 
 
     For many, what is perhaps missed when observing alignments in world politics is 
the social residue of partnerships.  As symbolic interactionism would presume, 
actors are socialized as relations are maintained.  Indeed, alliances may form purely 
because of common threats and strategic interests, but through the sharing of 
experiences, positive interaction, and successful extension – a social and emotional 
attachment can spawn, an inter-subjectivity reproduced – giving relations 
ontological meaning when material considerations recede.  With this thought, like 
the centrist variables of power, threats, and interests, identity can too play a role in 
alliance formation.  Hence, in light of the Iraq case, it is proper to think about a 
balance-of-identities theory – occupying the epistemic realm that most realists and 
neo-liberals often neglect.  Though perhaps not a “theory” in the sense that Waltz 
would agree with, its proposition is basic towards any thought on alliance making 
and ought to be taken with serious inquiry.   
     As noticed, an identity theory of balancing politics is conceptually different than 
the three established alternatives.  Though it maintains the philosophical logic of 
equilibrium, it is based off a different epistemology, with an emphasis on 
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ontological, rather than physical elements.  In essence, the balance-of-identities is a 
conditional theory for its key determinant maintains that any inter-relation amongst 
actors must exhibit a system-symmetry of identification.  In other words, from an 
international relations standpoint, no state involved can identify itself more towards 
any other for an absolute balance in this regard.  This “ideal” systemic arrangement 
is needed for material properties to have optimal unmodified credence in judging 
alliance politics.  Indeed, for realist variables to be completely “duty-free” in sorting 
out why states balance or bandwagon, a zero-net attachment, system-wide 
distribution is necessary.  To be sure, when judging alignment patterns, no material 
theory is genuinely valid when all the unit-actors involved are pre-imaged by one 
another as “friends” and “enemies”, since the theory’s objectivism would no longer 
be the central defining claim. 
     However, to make clear, a system reflecting an imbalance-of-identity is only half 
of the theoretical claim, since it does not fully guarantee that such a condition would 
work against realist assertions.  Indeed, two states can join forces against a third 
because both the material and cultural order motivate them to. Though realist 
variables are largely materialized properties with embedded social expressions; 
identity is dynamic and presents a metaphysical concept – subject to change and 
negotiation by agential means.  Hence, a holistic approach in encompassing both 
orders brings us towards a framework that is dualistic.  
     As noted, the unequal “distribution of identification” only tell us that material 
claims have been modified, but not necessarily to the point that they have been 
marginalized.  In order to judge the latter, the distinction comes from the degree of 
symmetry between the dualism expressed by the material and cultural orders.  For 
example, Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann had in The Social Construction of 
Reality described “successful socialization” in terms of symmetry between an 
individual’s objective and subjective realities.174  To be sure, an analogous logic is 
presented here.   
     When a relative disproportion of attachment is exhibited among actors, 
depending on this objective-subjective discrepancy, we can determine whether 
identity factors will complement or contradict material considerations in forming 
partnerships.  Hence, the balance-of-identities theory is meant to play a dialectic role 
from a non-materialistic position: as a cultural promotional utility (bandwagon) and 
a cultural preventive one (balance).  In that respect, when an imbalance exists and a 
degree of symmetry is expressed between the socio-cultural and material orders – 
identity works with realist propositions in solidifying alliances.  Indeed, this 
condition promotes a complementary dualism: both physical and ontological 
securities are coherently at risk.  Conversely, in accordance with an overall 
attachment disparity, when a degree of asymmetry is defined between the material-
cultural orders – identity functions in opposition with realist assertions.  This 
condition can marginalize the political weight given to materialized-variables – in 
effect – exemplifying a balancing feature.  Figure 1 below encompasses the identity 
role when a non-zero summation of identification is reflected in a given system.        
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Figure 1: The Effects of Identity on Alliance Formations     
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     To clarify, if the balance-of-identities is absolute: identity plays neither role, 
promotional nor preventive, since it is metaphysically neutralized.  It is the 
distinction between objective and subjective orders that can illuminate what part 
social factors would perform.  In the case of Iraq, that divergence is demonstrated: 
social and material considerations for the Kurds are largely in opposition, where the 
former is balancing the latter – leading them to overall bandwagon with the 
community that materialists would assume they balance, and balance against the 
community that realists would suggest they ally with.  This disparity exists because 
one relation of the triad had established a higher degree of inter-subjective rapport 
relative to the other.   
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     Indeed, hypothetically speaking, if Sunnis and Kurds were history’s victims in 
contrast to a Shiite regime, a more symmetrical feature would exist between both 
orders, and identity would presumably play a promotional role in forging a Kurdish-
Sunni alliance. Likewise, and counterfactually directed to realist skeptics: If Iraq 
were ruled by continuous Kurdish regimes that had collectively victimized Sunni 
and Shiite Arabs, would it be probable to conceive of a Shiite-Kurdish alliance 
today?  It would be difficult to imagine, because no sense of collective trauma would 
exist – at least between Shiites and Kurds.     
     When confronting realism’s material fixation of the security dilemma, Jennifer 
Mitzen had argued that “ontological security-seeking reveals another, second, 
dilemma in international politics: ontological security can conflict with physical 
security”.175  With respect to the balance-of-identities, a similar contradictory 
dualism persists: identity formations can conflict with realist-based alliance 
formations; social considerations can marginalize and sometimes override material 
ones.  To all intents and purposes, the very emphasis on social properties in 
alignment configurations is acknowledged to deviate from general realist theory.   
     To that effect, Glenn Snyder had come close; describing the role of an 
“identification effect” in alliance politics, but dishearteningly asserted, “these effects 
are limited in a multipolar system...by the likelihood that relationships will be 
temporary”.176  Indeed, he points to the irrationality behind two great powers allying 
against a weaker third, simply stating they “have no incentive to ally” in the first 
place.177  John Mearsheimer asserted a similar materially-inclined logic, claiming 
“each side cares about the other only to the extent that the other side’s behavior 
affects its own prospects for achieving maximum profits”.178  Both, in line with the 
traditional realist argument – in effect – overlook and disenchant the agential motive 
for social and cultural incentives, as an ontological service. None properly merit 
identity as a necessary feature of international political life.   
     Generally speaking, a world of clashing civilizations as witnessed in Iraq should 
put security at the top of everyone’s list.  Yet in such an antagonistic and uncertain 
environment, two groups had not defected, as the supposed prisoner’s dilemma 
would presume.  The fact that Shiites and Kurds instead chose to cooperate based on 
a sharing of the past “experiences” shows how powerful social bonds can potentially 
be.  Directed towards the individual level, one would find it difficult not picking a 
loving younger brother to participate in a scrimmage football match, even though it 
would be rational and in his best interest to quickly pick the best player before the 
other side gets him – since the end goal is to essentially win.  Though some of us 
may yield to the threat of competing against the most athletic, the idea that one 
would find it “difficult” may limit to how badly he wants to pulverize the other team 
or how enjoyable it would be after winning.  At the extreme end – especially if the 
game involves the penalties found in world politics – some might join with friends 
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and family members on the opposing side, consequently going against the overall 
interests of one’s own teammates.  In this perspective, a people’s collective identity 
– founded by emotional attachment and a social epistemology – can transcend the 
value invested in national identity – or in this case – team identity.       
     The point is, that partnerships exhibit an epistemic dualism: that actors are not 
only situated in a material structure, but also concurrently in a social and cultural 
one – insinuating that they also operate within a dynamic and normative framework, 
not a linear model provided by the variance of a single variable – power, threat, and 
interest.  However, what is suggested in this article is not to be perceived as a 
replacement of the balance-of-power, balance-of-threats, or balance-of-interests.  
After all, depending on the condition, realist arguments do have a role to play when 
investigating alignment patterns.  Unlike Walt’s ostensible “modification” of Waltz, 
I am not bent on reinterpreting meanings.  Nor is it the case, unlike the realist 
alternatives, suggesting a grand alliance theory of “this is why alignments happen” 
in world politics. Rather, a balance-of-identities proposes a social inclusion of sort, 
in an effort for a more holistic feature.   
     While bearing in mind Schweller’s plea for conditionality, what is offered here 
may be suggested as a needed underlining principle – an addition to Waltz’s two 
prerequisites for realist-balancing theories to play out – that any given system must 
not reflect such a gross imbalance-of-identities that would severely modify 
objectivist claims.  In that effect, arguments made by Waltz, Walt, and Schweller 
may still adhere to “why alliances form” given a specific circumstance, but that is 
only to the extent to which their central variables (power, threat, interest) will 
comply with an identity-balanced environment.  As Wendt had challenged if a 
political culture of self-help was “a logical or contingent feature of anarchy”, a 
similar thought is assumed here: the balance-of-power is just one particular way of 
thinking about alliance politics.179  
 
A Constructivist Version of Underbalancing? 
 
     The refining of Waltz’s original take on the balance-of-power by other IR 
theorists comes short of explaining many instances of states not balancing against an 
external surfeit of power or threats, even when it is in their best interest to do so.  
Indeed, Randall Schweller had recognized this discrepancy – later proclaiming an 
underbalancing theory due to a state’s internal dynamics.  Like other neoclassical 
realists, Schweller undermines structural realism’s propositions that states are given 
a unitary assumption and that the nature of international politics is simply governed 
by the structure of the system. Satisfying and long overdue towards the paradigm, 
his theory is meant to bring forth internal conditions in explaining why the balance 
of power is not a natural phenomenon. He even goes on further to incorporate a 
state’s societal characteristics as part of the equation in explaining why some leave 
threats unanswered.  
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     However, his variables – elite consensus, elite cohesion, social cohesion, and 
regime vulnerability – are about the temporal state of things.  But moreover, his 
theory is characteristically mechanical, concerned with the uniform functionality of 
a state.  Indeed, though Schweller incorporates social variables in determining what 
ripe conditions for underbalancing behavior look like, those variables are embedded 
in an operational context – wherein they affect state unitary function, not ideational 
transformations.  For instance, “social cohesion” pertains to a strictly internal 
condition as “it is about a psychological feeling of solidarity within a society”, not 
an inter-subjectivity felt between them.180  Hence, his take on underbalancing is 
primarily an operationally inclined negative theory, in that its basic premise serves 
as a constraint – enlightening us about why things that were supposed to happen did 
not.   
     To reiterate, encompassing a dualistic function gives the balance-of-identities a 
more holistic perspective: it can not only give us generalizations about alignment 
patterns, but also help us explain anomalies – understanding why some actions that 
were not meant to happen did and others that were supposed to, did not.  Focusing 
on the asymmetric condition when identity plays a preventive role, the imbalance-
of-identities can be theorized as ‘a’ constructivist version of underbalancing.  While 
this proposition is severely different in formulation from Schweller’s, both 
arguments are in essence meant to explain why there is an absence of balance where 
one should be.  One develops a theory based on domestic and “political constraints”, 
while the other emphasizes its limitations on the basis of identification in the 
epistemological context of the identity-making industry: culture, emotions, myths, 
narratives, historical memories, beliefs, and so on.  In the operational context, actors 
A and B will not balance one another so long as: (1) A and B are inter-subjectively 
more Selfness in relation to the Otherness of C; (2) The value placed on materialist 
properties – in terms of costs and incentives – does not outweigh the value invested 
in the social bond; and (3) That A’s and B’s reluctance to balance against one 
another does not threaten the survival of neither side – as long as they believe their 
own existence is more important than any other’s.   
     To clarify, social bonds are not unbreakable.  For example, a man may end his 
marriage to his wife in relieving a degree of punishment inflicted upon him; or 
defect to a certain amount of material incentives offered.  If perhaps he still refuses 
to give in, either by valuing his loving relationship or avoiding the expectation of 
social sanctions received from significant and generalized others, he may yield when 
his own survival or when a more valued social bond (his children) are at risk.  
Quintessentially, the stronger social bonds are, the higher the material degree needed 
to break them – given the social construction of how valuable those material 
properties are to the actor.  Relatively speaking, an exceptionally higher cost or 
incentive is needed to breach the US-UK “friendship” than the Syrian-Iranian axis – 
provided that both equally value their interest-based partnership. 
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An Iraqi Cosmopolitanism 
 
     “So far what has been achieved resembles a cease-fire more than a real peace”, 
said Barham Saleh, Iraq’s deputy prime minister during a 2008 interview.181  The 
grim statement had elucidated the country’s political realities, often times 
ambiguous to the American public.  To all intents and purposes, media consensus 
had acknowledged the success of the U.S. ‘surge’ strategy in abating Iraq’s violence 
and though the statistics show a positive trend in the security sector, the primary 
factors that had led to an ostensible safer Iraq are contingent on aspects that could 
easily be reversed.182 Yet confidence among American policymakers has generated 
inclinations to negotiate with Baghdad a fixated timetable for withdrawal.  But is 
Iraq socially, not only politically, ready to be left all alone? 
     In an effort to utilize the lessons associated with collective trauma and Iraqi 
history, it is appropriate to offer a policy prescription in confronting Iraq’s underling 
problem: basic trust provided by overarching reconciliation.  Indeed, as Dennis Ross 
had recently claimed, “The continuing problem in Iraq is that Shi’a and Sunnis are 
not building bridges or understandings between each other either at national or local 
levels”.183  
     One particular way of building those bridges is thinking about resuming what 
‘Abd al-Karim Qasim had began in 1958 – collectivizing a national identity and 
documenting Iraq’s distinct culture. To be suggestive, if we can think about Iraq as 
an internal anarchic order, we can prescribe the need for an Iraqi cosmopolitanism, 
coinciding with Martha Nussbaum’s claim for world cosmopolitan education.184  
But rather than embedding the idea of world identification, national loyalties need be 
hardened through the concept of Iraqi citizenship. 
     Genuine reconciliation entails more than just monetary exchanges and 
institutionalizing quotas or even righting past wrongs.  At a fundamental level, it 
needs a redefinition in its collective identity, involving the symbolic social 
incorporation of the other’s narrative.  Education can be one such powerful method 
in achieving this.  Learning the traumas of all three communities under Saddam and 
during the Iran-Iraq War provides a real potential in constructing a distinct national 
identity.  Patriotism and honor in serving one’s country need be emphasized among 
Iraq’s youth. Shiite and Kurdish elites need invite Sunnis to participate in 
memorializing and ritualizing these tragedies, since many of them had also suffered.  
In this perspective, trauma can have very auspicious effects, since it has the ability 
to tear and shred old fixated cultures and afterwards heal and rebuild new extensions 
                                                 
181 Asharq al-Awsat interview with Barham Saleh, February 11, 2008.  
182 Ramzy Mardini, “Revisiting Misperceptions of America’s Iraq Strategy”, Middle East 
Times, April 24, 2008.  
183 Dennis Ross, “Statecraft in the Middle East”, The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2008, 
p. 8. 
184 Nussbaum (1994). 
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as a re-socialization process.  National narratives are negotiable, and the presence 
can change the interpretation of the past.185
     Iraq today may be experiencing less bloodshed, but the relative absence of 
violence is not derived from general institutionalized norms or socialized inter/intra-
ethnic relations.  Rather it is based off external and contingent circumstances, like 
the U.S. maintenance of the Awakening councils, militia ceasefires, and the erection 
of walls separating Sunni and Shiite neighborhoods.  The status of Kirkuk has yet to 
be solved along with other “disputed territories” that may pressure some militias to 
activate their status, including former insurgents within the Awakening tribal 
coalition. Cases of impulsive outbreaks of violence, like those witnessed in Rwanda 
and the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s, can be the unfortunate fate of a future, un-
reconciled Iraq.  Indeed, but rather than the ‘political’ reconciliation being talked 
about as a final condition for U.S. withdrawal, what Iraq needs towards 
encompassing a Lockean political culture – securing societal progress from reverting 
to its past antagonistic nature – is the aspect of social reconciliation.   
     But in order to accomplish this, security must first be provided in fostering social 
intercourse, implying that the United States must have a substantial and prolonged 
presence in Iraq.  Otherwise, when the salience to do so arises, Iraqis will rely and 
fall back on old yet established subgroup identities.     
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